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Disable guest WebAssembly by default; add an opt-in permission

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评估

难度
5/5
预计耗时
一周以上
新手友好度
35/100
Issue 类型
功能
描述清晰度
基本清楚
活跃度
冷清
技术栈
rust, typescript, wasm

调研方向

首先,跟踪 CreateVmConfig 在 wire 上的传递过程,以及权限如何到达 NodeRuntime/secure-exec TypeScript 客户端和 Rust 客户端。查看 runtime-platform 文档和现有的默认拒绝权限模型。当 guest WebAssembly 默认禁用、opt-in scope 在两个客户端上都能正常工作,并且安全性依据和 npm 包的权衡取舍都已记录时,即视为完成。

由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。

描述

Summary

Make guest WebAssembly disabled by default, and add a permission scope users opt into to re-enable it (consistent with our deny-by-default permission posture).

Motivation

Today the guest WebAssembly API is always available in the V8 isolate (runtime-platform docs: "WebAssembly stays available on every tier"). There is currently no way to disable it (no expose_wasm / jitless flag plumbed through the runtime).

WebAssembly grants the guest no additional capability over JavaScript (both are isolate-confined, have no ambient authority, and route all I/O through the kernel), and the classic side-channel vector (Spectre via SharedArrayBuffer + high-resolution timers) is already mitigated by default by timingMitigation: "freeze" (removes SharedArrayBuffer, freezes timers).

The remaining, legitimate concern is V8 JIT/compiler attack surface: the WASM compiler is large and complex, and WASM JIT bugs have historically been used for in-isolate memory-corruption → sandbox escapes. For maximally-untrusted workloads, being able to remove that surface is valuable defense-in-depth. Since we are deny-by-default everywhere else, WASM should follow the same model.

Proposed design

  • Add a permission scope, e.g. permissions: { webAssembly: "allow" | "deny" }, deny by default.
  • When denied, the guest's WebAssembly global is unavailable (and ideally the isolate runs without the WASM compiler / jitless where feasible) so the JIT attack surface is actually removed, not just the global hidden.
  • Plumb through CreateVmConfig on the wire and expose on both the TypeScript client (NodeRuntime / secure-exec) and the Rust client (per the wire/client-parity rule).
  • Update the runtime-platform docs: note WASM is off by default for hardening, how to opt in, and the security rationale (no extra capability; side-channels already mitigated; this reduces JIT attack surface).

Tradeoff to weigh during design

Some real npm packages ship WASM internally (certain crypto/compression/image/parsing libs). Deny-by-default will break those unless the user opts in, so the opt-in must be easy and clearly documented. (If default-off proves too disruptive in practice, the fallback is default-on with an easy opt-out, but the issue as filed requests default-off + opt-in.)

Notes

  • Distinct from the WASI command runtime that runs sh/coreutils (those are separate WASM binaries the sidecar runs); this is specifically the guest's WebAssembly global.
主要语言
TypeScript
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30 天内没有已合并 PR

环境准备

  • 提供 Dockerfile 或 Docker Compose 文件
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  • 没有贡献指南

从这里开始

  1. 先读完整个 Issue,再读项目的贡献指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库,在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request,并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

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