Hacktoberfest 2026：维护者为十月标记出来的 issue，仍然开放、适合新手。 浏览 Hacktoberfest issue

JSON-RPC: sendChatText / broadcastChatMessage / setServerName accept unbounded strings

未关闭
  • 哪里不对？
#3,950 2 条评论 0 个 reaction 已指派 1 人 在 GitHub 查看

维护者通常 5 天内回复

@ann0see 已经在做这个了。

开始于 2026年9月14日。

评估

这个 Issue 还没有评估数据。

描述

AI

Describe the bug

jamulusclient/sendChatText, jamulusserver/broadcastChatMessage and jamulusserver/setServerName validate only that their string parameter is a string — no length bound — unlike the sibling chat methods, which reject input above MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (1600):

  • jamulusserver/privateChatMessage — rejects > MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/serverrpc.cpp:125).
  • jamulusserver/setWelcomeMessage — rejects > MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/serverrpc.cpp:325).

Normal clients cannot produce such input: the GUI chat dialog truncates input at MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/chatdlg.cpp:111). So these three methods deviate from both the peer RPC methods and the GUI path.

Reachable impact on current main

Since #3861 the JSON-RPC transport caps each request line at 16 KiB (MAX_JSON_RPC_REQUEST_BYTES, src/rpcserver.cpp:116), so the message is transport-bounded. It still exceeds the receive-side limits: EvaluateChatTextMes reads at most MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT_PLUS_HTML (1800) chars (src/protocol.cpp:1424) and split reassembly caps at 36 parts, while the sender fragments via CreateAndSendMessage with ceil(len / 550) parts and no part-count cap (src/protocol.cpp:590). Result: a ~16 KiB broadcastChatMessage produces a ~27-datagram split burst per connected client that is then silently discarded by every peer. Not memory-unsafe; low severity, but the handlers do not enforce the parameter contract their siblings and the GUI do. An oversized setServerName similarly carries into server-list registration messages to directories and clients.

To Reproduce

  1. Run a server: jamulus -s --nogui --jsonrpcport 22150 --jsonrpcsecretfile <secret> (secret >= 16 chars), connect one client.
  2. Call jamulusserver/broadcastChatMessage with chatMessage of 10,000 chars. Handler returns ok; peers receive the fragmented message and drop it (receiver bound 1800).
  3. Call it with 20,000 chars: transport rejects with Parse error: Request exceeds maximum size of 16384 bytes.

Measured against 3.12.5dev (292506eb): 15,000-char broadcast accepted with a +416 KB server RSS delta and ~27 split parts per client; 20,000-char rejected by the 16 KiB boundary.

Expected behavior

sendChatText, broadcastChatMessage (and setServerName) reject input above MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT with iErrInvalidParams, mirroring privateChatMessage / setWelcomeMessage.

Version of Jamulus

3.12.5dev (292506eb), JSON-RPC enabled.

Additional context

Formalizes the "String parameters are bounded inconsistently" item of #3916. #3861 bounds the transport; this issue is the remaining handler-level gap.

🤖 Used AI: big-pickle, opencode

主要语言
C
星标
1.1k
派生
248
平均合并
7 天 4 小时
30 天内合并 PR
5

环境准备

从这里开始

  1. 先读完整个 Issue，再读项目的贡献指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库，在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request，并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

jamulussoftware/jamulus 的其他 Issue

查看 jamulussoftware/jamulus 的全部 Issue

相似的 Issue

更多 C Issue

把新 issue 发到你的邮箱

精选适合新手参与的 GitHub issue 摘要。