Security hardening backlog: Windows cmd injection, config load/create path scoping, unbounded session store, barcode dir validation, server-only exposure

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难度
4/5
预计耗时
3-5 天
新手友好度
40/100
Issue 类型
缺陷
描述清晰度
基本清楚
活跃度
活跃
技术栈
python, typescript

调研方向

The issue lists six security fixes with file:line refs, e.g. src/profiles/utils/file_utils.py:469-471 and web/src/utils/barcodeScanner.ts:82-84. Read each named module, reproduce the vector, and apply the suggested shell-free or validation fix. Done when all checklist boxes are checked and tests pass.

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描述

enhancement security

Companion to the three high-severity issues. Each item below is MED/LOW on its own; all verified against the code.

  • Windows cmd /c start injection. src/profiles/utils/file_utils.py:469-471 runs ["cmd", "/c", "start", "", path, *tokens]; tokens from launch-with-args are shlex.split-ed but then re-parsed by cmd.exe — a token like &calc or %WINDIR% executes arbitrary commands. Also src/profiles/core/actions.py:495-499 builds cmd /K "cd /D {path}" — a directory named x & calc (legal on Windows) injects via /api/actions/open-terminal. Fix: shell-free APIs (os.startfile/ShellExecuteEx), separate argv flags, or reject cmd metacharacters in args on Windows.
  • Config load/create accept arbitrary absolute paths. POST /api/config/load accepts any *.profiles* path on disk (routes/config.py:143-148); POST /api/config/create does mkdir(parents=True) + writes the starter template at any directory (config.py:191-211 → launch/creation.py:47-68). Scope to configured/active directories, or token-gate.
  • Workflow session store is unbounded. _sessions: dict (routes/workflow.py:74) is never pruned → memory growth from repeated starts. Cap + TTL (also relates to #24's dangling sessions).
  • Barcode dir= sets an arbitrary scan target. web/src/utils/barcodeScanner.ts:82-84 + App.tsx:1046-1106: a scanned barcode can set dir to any path (e.g. a UNC \\attacker\share, causing NTLM leakage on Windows) and auto-triggers a scan. Validate scheme/plain paths; warn before scanning non-local targets.
  • --server-only binds 0.0.0.0 with no auth (app.py:262; LAN banner at app.py:296-299). If LAN sharing is a feature, require the instance token and print a token-scoped URL; otherwise default to loopback.
  • Handoff manifest hardening. desktop/instance.py:47-64 has good hygiene (mkstemp 0600, atomic replace) but read_manifest accepts any syntactically valid JSON with a live PID — a local process could pre-place a manifest for the fallback port and hijack a handoff. Verify owner == current user and mtime after server start.
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Python
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