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security: S5 recidivism is per-model, so a validator can spread missed votes across models and never escalate

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Issue 类型
缺陷
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基本清楚
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技术栈
solidity

调研方向

Read foundry/src/DinValidatorStake.sol, especially slashPartial, _trimAndRecordPartialSlash, and the NatSpec for _partialSlashGIs, then review Row 11 in Developer/design/adversarial-threat-model.md. The issue describes three possible approaches, each requiring a design choice that preserves safe handling of interleaved per-model GI indices. Done means the Row 11 gap is addressed and the corresponding test_knownGap_… changes to test_defended_….

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描述

enhancement

Summary

S5 recidivism escalation (full MIN_STAKE slash + jail) is counted per slasher contract, i.e. per model. A validator registered on several models can spread liveness faults across them so no single model's counter ever reaches s5RecidivismThreshold.

DinValidatorStake.slashPartial records each partial slash in _partialSlashGIs[validator][msg.sender] (foundry/src/DinValidatorStake.sol:309), where msg.sender is the calling DINTaskCoordinator / DINTaskAuditor. With the defaults (window 5 GIs, threshold 3, DinValidatorStake.sol:196-198), a validator can miss up to 2 votes/submissions per model per window on every model it serves. Across N models that is (threshold − 1) × N misses per window without S5 ever firing, and isValidatorActive stays true throughout.

Why it is keyed per contract today

This is deliberate, not an oversight. giIndex is a per-model counter, so different models' GI sequences interleave arbitrarily. A single shared ring per validator would receive non-monotonic values and underflow the ascending-order trim in _trimAndRecordPartialSlash (see the NatSpec on _partialSlashGIs, DinValidatorStake.sol:136-146). Any fix has to keep that safety property.

Impact

A validator can stay chronically unreliable across the network while only ever paying the S2 partial slashes (s2SlashFractionBps, 30% of minStake per miss by default). The escalation that is meant to eject repeat offenders never triggers. The per-miss partial slashes still apply, so this is a cost-reduction gap, not a free pass.

Options

  • Model-independent window: track partial slashes per validator in a time-based (block timestamp) or platform-level sequence window that is monotonic across all slashers, and escalate on the aggregate count.
  • Two-level check: keep the per-slasher ring for per-model escalation and add a global per-validator counter with its own threshold.
  • Accept and document it as a trust assumption, with the per-model threshold calibrated so that (threshold − 1) × typical model count misses per window is tolerable.

Tracking

Row 11 (KNOWN GAP) of the adversarial threat model, Developer/design/adversarial-threat-model.md (task_240926_17, merged via PR No. 182). Part 2's test_knownGap_… for Row 11 should flip to test_defended_… when this is fixed.

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