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Router allows exec paths hidden behind dot segments (/./exec, /x/../exec)

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难度
3/5
预计耗时
1-2 天
新手友好度
56/100
Issue 类型
缺陷
描述清晰度
描述清楚
活跃度
活跃
技术栈
docker, go, rust, typescript

调研方向

Read the router implementations and the existing empty segment checks in Go, Rust, and TypeScript, then inspect the spec flags and properties named in the issue. Add the dot segment cases to each router table and mirror the ALLOW_EMPTY_INTERIOR and emptySegmentsHideNoExec coverage. Done means dot segments are denied for every method in all three implementations, with the requested curl --path-as-is integration check passing.

由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。

描述

Priority: P2 Type: Bug

Describe the bug
The router allows exec paths hidden behind dot segments. GET /./exec/<id>/json and GET /x/../exec/<id>/json have a first segment of . or x, so the exec check (#49) does not match and the GET passthrough forwards them. This is the same class as the //exec/... bypass fixed for #55 (empty path segment not allowed), which only covers empty segments.

Found in the review of the #55 Task 3 PR. Router-level probe on that branch (Route("GET", path)):

Path Go TS Rust
/./exec/abc/json Allow Allow Allow (by code reading, not probed)
/x/../exec/abc/json Allow Allow Allow (by code reading, not probed)
/containers/./mycontainer/exec Deny (exec) Deny (exec) Deny (exec)

Impact: as with // before #55, a live daemon is expected to answer dot-segment paths with a 301 to the clean path, so nothing should leak. A client that follows the redirect re-enters the proxy on the clean path and is denied. But the router allows an exec path, which the spec's intent forbids, and it depends on daemon behaviour the proxy does not control.

Affected implementation(s)

  • All

To Reproduce

  1. Any policy.
  2. curl --path-as-is --unix-socket proxy.sock 'http://localhost/./exec/<id>/json'
  3. The proxy forwards it (the daemon's answer, not a proxy 403).

Expected behavior
Deny any path with a . or .. segment for every method, right after the empty-segment check, e.g. dot path segment not allowed. Same check in Go, Rust and TS; a spec flag and property mirroring ALLOW_EMPTY_INTERIOR / emptySegmentsHideNoExec (exec path after dot-segment removal ⇒ denied); table rows in all three; an integration check with curl --path-as-is.

Alternatives considered:

  • Normalise the path (RFC 3986 remove_dot_segments) and route on the result. Rejected: the proxy would then forward a path different from the one it routed, or have to rewrite it; denying is simpler and the Docker CLI never sends dot segments.
  • Rely on the daemon's 301. Rejected for the same reason as #55: the router should not allow an exec path at all.

Environment

  • Docker 29.4.0 (OrbStack), branch fix/empty-segment-head-55.

Additional context
README.md and spec/README.md on that branch say dot segments are not denied yet.

主要语言
Rust
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2
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12 小时 11 分钟
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环境准备

从这里开始

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  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库,在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request,并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

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