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Enterprise-Managed Authorization: say how the Resource Authorization Server gets the IdP's signing keys

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#34 3 comentários 0 reações 1 responsável Ver no GitHub

@pcarleton já está trabalhando nisso.

Desde 6/10/2026.

Avaliação

Dificuldade
4/5
Tempo estimado
3-5 dias
Facilidade para iniciantes
45/100
Tipo de issue
Documentação
Clareza
Razoavelmente clara
Status de atividade
Ativa
Domínio
authentication, authorization, documentation, security

Direção de pesquisa

Start with section 5.1 and the referenced ID-JAG §4.4.1, then compare the OpenID Connect Discovery and RFC 8414 metadata requirements. Done means the specification explains how the Resource Authorization Server obtains signing keys and includes the proposed User-Agent guidance, with the origin, rotation, and multi-tenant questions resolved.

Escrita pelo modelo de indexação a partir do texto da issue.

Descrição

Problem

Section 5.1 sends ID-JAG processing to §4.4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04, which requires a valid signature. Neither document says how the Resource Authorization Server finds the IdP's signing keys. The draft assumes the Resource Authorization Server already trusts the IdP, but trusting an issuer doesn't tell you where its keys are.

We implement this extension in Notion's hosted MCP server and have tested it against several IdPs. Each implementation has to choose, on its own:

  • how to find the keys (jwks_uri from OpenID Connect Discovery, from RFC 8414 metadata, or configured by hand);
  • whether jwks_uri must be on the issuer's origin;
  • when to refetch keys after rotation;
  • how to handle multi-tenant issuers.

One failure from our testing shows the cost. An IdP behind a CDN web application firewall returned 403 to our JWKS fetch, because the library making it sent no User-Agent. Our discovery fetch to the same host sent one and got 200. Nothing in the spec chain told either side what to expect. (Library fix: cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider#394.)

Proposal

Additive, no breaking changes. In section 5.1:

  1. The Resource Authorization Server SHOULD get the IdP's signing keys from the jwks_uri in the metadata for the ID-JAG's iss, found with OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 or RFC 8414.
  2. A non-normative note: metadata, JWKS, and Client ID Metadata Document fetches are ordinary HTTP requests, so they SHOULD include a User-Agent per RFC 9110 §10.1.5. IdPs commonly sit behind firewalls that block requests without one.

Open questions

  • Should rule 1 live here, or in the ID-JAG draft so it covers non-MCP uses too?
  • Should jwks_uri have to share the issuer's origin? We require it today. It narrows where keys can come from, but some IdPs may host keys on a separate domain.
  • Is refetch-on-unknown-kid guidance for key rotation in scope?

This looks to us like a clarification that doesn't need a SEP. We're happy to follow the SEP process if the maintainers prefer, and to send a PR with the wording.

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Estrelas
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Forks
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