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Enterprise-Managed Authorization: say how the Resource Authorization Server gets the IdP's signing keys

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  • ¿Algo no está bien?
#34 3 comentarios 0 reacciones 1 asignado Ver en GitHub

@pcarleton ya está trabajando en esto.

Desde el 6/10/2026.

Evaluación

Dificultad
4/5
Tiempo estimado
3-5 días
Aptitud para principiantes
45/100
Tipo de issue
Documentación
Claridad
Bastante claro
Estado de actividad
Activo
Área
authentication, authorization, documentation, security

Línea de trabajo

Start with section 5.1 and the referenced ID-JAG §4.4.1, then compare the OpenID Connect Discovery and RFC 8414 metadata requirements. Done means the specification explains how the Resource Authorization Server obtains signing keys and includes the proposed User-Agent guidance, with the origin, rotation, and multi-tenant questions resolved.

Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.

Descripción

Problem

Section 5.1 sends ID-JAG processing to §4.4.1 of draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04, which requires a valid signature. Neither document says how the Resource Authorization Server finds the IdP's signing keys. The draft assumes the Resource Authorization Server already trusts the IdP, but trusting an issuer doesn't tell you where its keys are.

We implement this extension in Notion's hosted MCP server and have tested it against several IdPs. Each implementation has to choose, on its own:

  • how to find the keys (jwks_uri from OpenID Connect Discovery, from RFC 8414 metadata, or configured by hand);
  • whether jwks_uri must be on the issuer's origin;
  • when to refetch keys after rotation;
  • how to handle multi-tenant issuers.

One failure from our testing shows the cost. An IdP behind a CDN web application firewall returned 403 to our JWKS fetch, because the library making it sent no User-Agent. Our discovery fetch to the same host sent one and got 200. Nothing in the spec chain told either side what to expect. (Library fix: cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider#394.)

Proposal

Additive, no breaking changes. In section 5.1:

  1. The Resource Authorization Server SHOULD get the IdP's signing keys from the jwks_uri in the metadata for the ID-JAG's iss, found with OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 or RFC 8414.
  2. A non-normative note: metadata, JWKS, and Client ID Metadata Document fetches are ordinary HTTP requests, so they SHOULD include a User-Agent per RFC 9110 §10.1.5. IdPs commonly sit behind firewalls that block requests without one.

Open questions

  • Should rule 1 live here, or in the ID-JAG draft so it covers non-MCP uses too?
  • Should jwks_uri have to share the issuer's origin? We require it today. It narrows where keys can come from, but some IdPs may host keys on a separate domain.
  • Is refetch-on-unknown-kid guidance for key rotation in scope?

This looks to us like a clarification that doesn't need a SEP. We're happy to follow the SEP process if the maintainers prefer, and to send a PR with the wording.

Lenguaje dominante
MDX
Estrellas
165
Forks
54
Sin PR fusionados en 30 d

Preparar el entorno

Primeros pasos

  1. Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
  2. Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
  3. Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
  4. Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.

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