php:*-apache + cap-drop ALL: mod_unixd setgid() failure leaves Apache workers running as UID 0 (privilege separation silently broken)
Ninguém assumiu esta issue ainda.
Avaliação
- Dificuldade
- 4/5
- Tempo estimado
- 3-5 dias
- Facilidade para iniciantes
- 35/100
- Tipo de issue
- Bug
- Clareza
- Razoavelmente clara
- Status de atividade
- Ativa
- Stack de tecnologia
- docker
- Domínio
- security
Direção de pesquisa
Start by reviewing the PHP Apache image configuration and its startup behavior alongside the reproduction in the issue. Determine whether the image should detect missing CAP_SETGID/CAP_SETUID when its parent starts as root and fail clearly, or whether the verified non-root usage belongs in documentation. Done means the chosen response prevents operators from mistaking root workers for successful privilege separation.
Escrita pelo modelo de indexação a partir do texto da issue.
Descrição
Summary
On the php:8.4.26-apache image (also reproduced with a locally built variant), running the
container with all capabilities dropped while the Apache parent starts as root breaks Apache's
privilege separation silently from a security perspective: mod_unixd cannot setgid()
(no CAP_SETGID), logs an alert, but the worker still serves requests as UID 0 instead of
www-data.
This matters because "root parent + --cap-drop ALL" is a common hardening recipe, and the
result is the opposite of the intended outcome: a compromised worker (any RCE in a PHP app)
executes as UID 0 rather than www-data.
Reproduction
docker run -d --name t --read-only --cap-drop ALL \
--tmpfs /var/run/apache2 \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:80 php:8.4.26-apache
sleep 3
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:8080/ # 200 — service looks healthy
docker top t -o user,pid,ppid,args
docker logs t 2>&1 | grep AH02156
Observed:
$ docker top t -o user,pid,ppid,args
USER PID PPID COMMAND
root 1692 1669 /usr/sbin/apache2 -DFOREGROUND
root 3261 1692 /usr/sbin/apache2 -DFOREGROUND <- worker, UID 0
$ docker logs t | grep -m1 AH02156
[unixd:alert] [pid 36] (1)Operation not permitted: AH02156: setgid: unable to set group id to Group 33
/proc/<worker>/status confirms Uid: 0 0 0 0 (with CapEff: 0 — so this is not full
root capability-wise, but it still owns every root-owned file on the filesystem for DAC
purposes, e.g. it can read /etc/shadow via owner bits, which www-data cannot).
The alert appears once per forked worker; HTTP keeps serving 200s, so nothing in normal
operation tells the operator that privilege separation is gone.
For contrast, starting the same image properly as non-root
(--user 33:33, unprivileged port, tmpfs /var/run/apache2 owned by 33) works fine and
workers run as www-data as expected — no AH02156.
Context
We hit this while testing exploit containment for the recent PHP vulnerabilities
(CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619, "php2shell") under hardened-container recipes. Full
write-up of the matched-pair experiment:
https://github.com/srayuth089 (lab notes) — happy to attach raw logs if useful.
Questions
- Is this behavior known / already being worked on (I couldn't find an existing issue)?
- In the team's view, does this warrant a fix in the image (e.g. fail loudly at startup if
the parent is root butCAP_SETGID/CAP_SETUIDare missing), or is it best handled as
documentation (a short "non-root usage" section in the image README describing the
supported pattern)? - If documentation is the preferred route, we're happy to send a PR with the verified
non-root recipe (user 33, port >1024,/etc/apache2/envvars, tmpfs ownership) — would
that be welcome indocker-library/docs, here, or both?
Not claiming this is a CVE by itself — it's a hardening-guidance foot-gun that inverts the
user's security intent, discovered during authorized lab research.
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- Ler o guia de contribuição
Primeiros passos
- Leia a issue inteira e depois o guia de contribuição do projeto.
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- Faça um fork do repositório e trabalhe em uma branch.
- Abra um pull request que referencie o número da issue.
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