php:*-apache + cap-drop ALL: mod_unixd setgid() failure leaves Apache workers running as UID 0 (privilege separation silently broken)

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まだ誰も着手していません。

評価

難易度
4/5
見積もり時間
3〜5日
初心者へのやさしさ
35/100
issue の種類
バグ
明瞭さ
おおむね明確
活発さ
活発
技術スタック
docker
領域
security

調査の方向性

Start by reviewing the PHP Apache image configuration and its startup behavior alongside the reproduction in the issue. Determine whether the image should detect missing CAP_SETGID/CAP_SETUID when its parent starts as root and fail clearly, or whether the verified non-root usage belongs in documentation. Done means the chosen response prevents operators from mistaking root workers for successful privilege separation.

索引モデルが issue の本文から書いたものです。

説明

Summary

On the php:8.4.26-apache image (also reproduced with a locally built variant), running the
container with all capabilities dropped while the Apache parent starts as root breaks Apache's
privilege separation silently from a security perspective: mod_unixd cannot setgid()
(no CAP_SETGID), logs an alert, but the worker still serves requests as UID 0 instead of
www-data.

This matters because "root parent + --cap-drop ALL" is a common hardening recipe, and the
result is the opposite of the intended outcome: a compromised worker (any RCE in a PHP app)
executes as UID 0 rather than www-data.

Reproduction

docker run -d --name t --read-only --cap-drop ALL \
  --tmpfs /var/run/apache2 \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:80 php:8.4.26-apache
sleep 3
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:8080/   # 200 — service looks healthy
docker top t -o user,pid,ppid,args
docker logs t 2>&1 | grep AH02156

Observed:

$ docker top t -o user,pid,ppid,args
USER   PID    PPID   COMMAND
root   1692   1669   /usr/sbin/apache2 -DFOREGROUND
root   3261   1692   /usr/sbin/apache2 -DFOREGROUND      <- worker, UID 0

$ docker logs t | grep -m1 AH02156
[unixd:alert] [pid 36] (1)Operation not permitted: AH02156: setgid: unable to set group id to Group 33

/proc/<worker>/status confirms Uid: 0 0 0 0 (with CapEff: 0 — so this is not full
root capability-wise, but it still owns every root-owned file on the filesystem for DAC
purposes, e.g. it can read /etc/shadow via owner bits, which www-data cannot).

The alert appears once per forked worker; HTTP keeps serving 200s, so nothing in normal
operation tells the operator that privilege separation is gone.

For contrast, starting the same image properly as non-root
(--user 33:33, unprivileged port, tmpfs /var/run/apache2 owned by 33) works fine and
workers run as www-data as expected — no AH02156.

Context

We hit this while testing exploit containment for the recent PHP vulnerabilities
(CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619, "php2shell") under hardened-container recipes. Full
write-up of the matched-pair experiment:
https://github.com/srayuth089 (lab notes) — happy to attach raw logs if useful.

Questions

  1. Is this behavior known / already being worked on (I couldn't find an existing issue)?
  2. In the team's view, does this warrant a fix in the image (e.g. fail loudly at startup if
    the parent is root but CAP_SETGID/CAP_SETUID are missing), or is it best handled as
    documentation (a short "non-root usage" section in the image README describing the
    supported pattern)?
  3. If documentation is the preferred route, we're happy to send a PR with the verified
    non-root recipe (user 33, port >1024, /etc/apache2/envvars, tmpfs ownership) — would
    that be welcome in docker-library/docs, here, or both?

Not claiming this is a CVE by itself — it's a hardening-guidance foot-gun that inverts the
user's security intent, discovered during authorized lab research.

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環境構築

はじめの一歩

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  3. リポジトリをフォークし、ブランチを切って変更します。
  4. issue 番号を参照したプルリクエストを送ります。

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