gateway: robustness hardening plan for WaveKV-synced state (fault isolation, blast-radius control)

Comienza con la secuencia P0 sugerida, leyendo gateway/src/web_routes/wavekv_sync.rs, gateway/src/kv/, gateway/src/main_service.rs y la crate wavekv; usa gateway/test-run/e2e/ para la matriz de versiones mixtas. Se considera terminado cuando estén implementadas las salvaguardas de validación, contención, recuperación, observabilidad y sincronización indicadas, pasen las comprobaciones pertinentes y ningún registro defectuoso deje fuera de servicio un estado no relacionado.

Context

dstack-gateway replicates its state (instances, nodes, certificates, DNS credentials, ACME account) across nodes via WaveKV. The gateway runs in a TEE and must stay robust when the KV contains bad data: a corrupt or malformed record for one CVM must never take down other instances or the whole cluster.

This issue tracks the findings of a robustness review of gateway/src/kv/, gateway/src/web_routes/wavekv_sync.rs, the KV→ProxyState consumption paths in gateway/src/main_service.rs, and the wavekv crate itself. The wavekv protocol redesign that came out of the same review is tracked separately in Phala-Network/wavekv#2 (RFC 0001: delta-state synchronization); the migration-relevant parts are summarized at the bottom.

What is already right (keep): ProxyState is the primary read path so the data plane does not depend on KV availability; per-key decode failures are warn-and-skip; get_acme_credentials() fails closed on corruption; peer URLs are validated; the sync endpoint enforces RA-TLS same-app-id mTLS, a 16 MiB body cap, and rejects node_id == 0.

---

P0 — paths where one bad input becomes a global outage

1. Decompression bomb on the sync endpoint

web_routes/wavekv_sync.rs: data.open(16.mebibytes()) caps the compressed size only; GzDecoder::read_to_end is unbounded. Gzip expands up to ~1000:1, so a single 16 MiB request from a compromised or buggy peer can force a ~16 GiB allocation → OOM kill.

• Cap decompressed size (decoder.take(limit) + error on overflow); also cap entry count and per-entry value size in the decoded SyncMessage.

2. One bad instance record can break the whole WireGuard config

reload_instances_from_kv_store imports KV instances into ProxyState verbatim; reconfigure() renders templates/wg.conf with escape = "none" and runs wg syncconf.

• A malformed public_key makes wg syncconf reject the entire config file — all instances lose wg updates (error is only logged). A key containing newlines can inject Endpoint=/AllowedIPs= directives.
• valid_ip() (client range / broadcast / reserved nets) is enforced at registration, but not on the KV import path: a synced instance can carry the gateway's own wg IP, a reserved-net IP, or an IP duplicating another instance (LWW cannot enforce cross-key invariants).
• Public-key uniqueness is checked in new_client_by_id but not on import.
• Re-run all registration-path semantic validation at the KV→ProxyState import boundary (pubkey is valid base64 32 bytes; IP in range; IP/pubkey uniqueness); skip only the offending instance, never abort the batch.
• Assert key/IP formats once more before rendering wg.conf.

3. unwrap_or_default() on corrupt global keys silently changes global behavior

The fail-closed pattern of get_acme_credentials() (absent ≠ tombstone ≠ corrupt) is not applied to its siblings:

• get_certbot_config(): a corrupt record silently falls back to defaults, i.e. switches acme_url to Let's Encrypt production and resets renewal intervals.
• get_default_dns_credential_id, get_acme_attestation, etc. treat corruption as absence.
• Extract the three-state helper (missing / deleted / corrupt→Err) and apply it to every global key whose corruption must not silently change behavior; alert on the corrupt case.

4. Wall-clock LWW + clock skew: one bad write can poison state cluster-wide

• A node with a future clock (or a corrupted i64::MAX-ish timestamp) wins every LWW conflict; the key becomes unfixable until real time catches up. No admin override exists.
• Gateway aggregations take max across nodes: get_instance_latest_handshake / get_node_latest_last_seen. One node writing future handshake timestamps keeps dead CVMs "alive" cluster-wide — recycle() never fires and top-N routing is distorted.
• Clamp/reject timestamps beyond local_now + max_drift on ingest and in aggregations.
• Admin "force put" escape hatch (writes with max(existing.ts)+1).
• (Long-term: HLC in wavekv v2 — see RFC.)

5. Local WAL/snapshot corruption prevents startup, though state is fully replicated

Node::new_with_persistence: read_all_ops() hard-fails on a checksum/deserialize error (while find_last_sequence tolerates the same); a corrupt 4-byte length prefix can trigger a multi-GiB allocation; a corrupt snapshot is fatal with no .bak fallback. Torn WAL tails are the normal crash artifact and should never brick the gateway.

• Wrap KvStore::new: on init failure, quarantine the data dir (rename .corrupt), start empty, re-bootstrap from peers.
• Upstream (wavekv): tolerant tail recovery, length sanity checks, snapshot generation fallback — tracked in RFC §3.10.

6. Global-lock amplifiers

• Node::read/write uses .expect() on a poisonable std::sync::RwLock: any panic while holding the write lock turns into a permanent crash loop. Switch to parking_lot (upstream).
• persist_if_dirty serializes + fsyncs the snapshot inside the global write lock, stalling registration/sync paths as state grows. Clone CoreState under the lock, write outside.

---

P1 — containment and correctness

7. "Decode failure = silently invisible" needs quarantine + visibility

A corrupt inst/ record makes that CVM vanish from routing with only a warn log.

• Maintain a quarantine list (key → error → entry meta) surfaced via admin/status; per-prefix decode-failure metrics + alerting.

8. No schema/quota enforcement on ingest

Any same-app peer can replicate arbitrary keys of arbitrary size to every node, persisted forever.

• Key-prefix whitelist (inst/, node/, cert/, dns_cred/, global/, __peer_addr/, conn/, handshake/, last_seen/), per-prefix value-size caps, global key-count/byte caps.
• GC for cert/{domain}/attestation/{timestamp} history (unbounded today).
• Note: cleanup_expired_tombstones is never called — tombstones grow forever; if ever enabled, it must be watermark-coordinated first (resurrection risk; see RFC §6).

9. Remote deletions never remove instances from ProxyState

reload_instances_from_kv_store only upserts. An instance recycled on node A stays in node B's ProxyState/wg config until B's own recycle timeout — a deregistered CVM remains routable in the window.

• On reload, explicitly remove instances present locally but absent/tombstoned in KV (with a reg_time grace window for not-yet-synced local registrations).

10. Schema evolution in a mixed-version cluster

Values use rmp_serde positional encoding. New-data→old-decoder fails during rolling upgrades/rollbacks → instances silently vanish on old nodes (compounds item 7).

• Written policy: additive #[serde(default)] fields only; bidirectional decode compat tests with old-version fixtures.
• Consider to_vec_named or a {version, body} envelope for new key types.

11. Minor consistency checks

• list_zt_domain_configs: assert value.domain matches the domain in the key; mismatch → quarantine.
• Document the worst-case behavior of the best-effort LWW locks (cert/{domain}/lock, rotation lock) — concurrent renewal is bounded by ACME idempotency today.
• Per-peer sync-lag metrics (a peer stuck in gap-drop today only produces warn spam).

---

Design-level follow-ups

• Formalize the import boundary: a single module through which all KV→ProxyState/CertStore/wg data flows, with decode → semantic → invariant validation layers and quarantine on failure (gives items 2/7/9/11 one home).
• Failure-domain separation: routing state, cert/keys, DNS creds, and attestation history share one lock/WAL/snapshot; consider per-domain stores so a poisoned cert subtree cannot stall instance sync.
• Secrets in KV: cert private keys, Cloudflare tokens, and the ACME account key are replicated in plaintext to every peer and included in full-dump responses. Consistent with the RA-TLS same-app trust model, but it makes any single gateway compromise a total credential compromise. Audit debug/admin endpoints for raw-KV exposure; consider KMS-derived encryption for sensitive values.
• Observability minimum set: per-prefix decode failures, quarantined keys, per-peer sync lag/last-success, KV size, wg syncconf failure alert.

---

WaveKV upgrade plan (tracked in Phala-Network/wavekv#2)

The protocol-level items (delta-state sync replacing op-logs; state digest for silent-divergence detection; ingest admission hooks/quotas; WAL/snapshot recovery hardening; coordinated tombstone GC; HLC deferred) are specified in the RFC. Gateway-side integration follows its staged plan:

• Phase 0 (wavekv 1.x prep): adopt state_digest() + per-peer sync metrics; compare digests via the admin plane; gate = digest equality across the production cluster.
• Phase 1 (wavekv 2.0 dual-stack): rolling upgrade one CVM at a time; gateway adds the /wavekv/sync2/{store} route with probe-and-fallback negotiation; promotion gate per node = cluster-wide digest equality + shim counters clean. Any single node can roll back (snapshot/WAL formats stay v1-loadable).
• Phase 2 (cleanup): after ≥14 days of digest equality on all-v2, drop the v1 sync route; only then take wire-breaking follow-ups (HLC).
• Mixed-version e2e matrix runs on gateway/test-run/e2e/ (3-node harness); test list in RFC §8.5.

Suggested sequencing overall: P0.1 → P0.2 → P0.5 → P0.3+P0.4, then the import-boundary refactor + observability, with the wavekv Phase 0/1 work proceeding in parallel under the RFC.