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kms: record OS image version and dev flag on-chain in the next-gen contract

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#1,384 0 comentarios 0 reacciones 0 asignados Ver en GitHub

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Evaluación

Dificultad
5/5
Tiempo estimado
Más de una semana
Aptitud para principiantes
35/100
Tipo de issue
Nueva funcionalidad
Claridad
Bastante claro
Estado de actividad
Activo
Stack tecnológico
rust, solidity

Línea de trabajo

Start with the next-generation KMS contract around DstackKms, addOsImageHash, allowedOsImages, and isAppAllowed, then trace the verifier's attestation paths that consume os_image_hash. Resolve the compatibility and dev-image policy questions before implementing storage and events; done means on-chain metadata can be retrieved for each hash and unavailable platform fields can be filled from it.

Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.

Descripción

Problem

The verifier only reports os_image_is_dev / os_image_version on the TDX legacy path, the one path that downloads the image and reads metadata.json. TDX lite, SEV-SNP, GCP TDX, AWS NitroTPM and Nitro Enclave carry only the manifest digest, so both fields are null there (#1266). Right now relying parties can't tell a dev image from a prod image on those paths, and can't enforce a minimum version. The only thing they can do is keep their own os_image_hash allowlist.

DstackKms already whitelists OS images on-chain, but it stores just a bool for each hash (allowedOsImages), so the chain doesn't know what the hash is.

Proposal

In the next-generation KMS contract, store metadata for each OS image hash, for example:

struct OsImageInfo {
    bool allowed;
    bool isDev;
    string version; // e.g. "0.5.10"
}
mapping(bytes32 => OsImageInfo) public osImages;
  • addOsImageHash takes isDev and version, and emits them in the event.
  • Every attestation path can look up version and dev status by os_image_hash from the same source. This doesn't need image downloads or metadata.json.
  • KMS / relying-party policy can reject dev images or enforce a minimum version from on-chain data.
  • The verifier can fill in os_image_is_dev / os_image_version from the contract when the platform doesn't expose them.

The owner who allowlists a hash vouches for its metadata. This is the same trust we already give to the allowlist.

Open questions

  • Keep allowedOsImages(bytes32) -> bool as a view for compatibility with existing consumers?
  • Should dev images be allowed at all on production KMS instances, or should the contract reject isDev images directly in isAppAllowed?
Lenguaje dominante
Rust
Estrellas
551
Forks
97
Merge medio
1 d 8 h
PR fusionados (30 d)
182

Guía de contribución

Abrir la guía de contribución

Primeros pasos

  1. Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
  2. Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
  3. Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
  4. Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.

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