Consent-JWT / Consent-Id / PSD2-CERT header lookups are case-sensitive, so they silently fail over HTTP/2

从 obp-api/src/main/scala/code/api/util/APIUtil.scala 开始，阅读 getConsentJWT、getConsentIdRequestHeaderValue、getPSD2-CERT 以及附近的 header 查找逻辑。在文件中搜索 filter(_.name == RequestHeader...) 并将其行为与 getRequestHeader() 进行比较。完成标准是：小写的 HTTP/2 header 名称解析出的 consent 值与大小写混合的 HTTP/1.1 请求相同。

Title: Consent-JWT / Consent-Id / PSD2-CERT header lookups are case-sensitive, so they silently fail over HTTP/2

Several request-header lookups in APIUtil.scala compare the header's
name field with == against a fixed-case literal, instead of doing a
case-insensitive comparison:

// obp-api/src/main/scala/code/api/util/APIUtil.scala
def getConsentJWT(requestHeaders: List[HTTPParam]): Option[String] = {
  requestHeaders.toSet.filter(_.name == RequestHeader.`Consent-JWT`).toList match {
    case x :: Nil => Some(x.values.mkString(", "))
    case _ => requestHeaders.toSet.filter(_.name == RequestHeader.`Consent-Id`).toList match {
      case x :: Nil => Some(x.values.mkString(", "))
      case _ => None
    }
  }
}

The same pattern appears for Consent-ID (a second, differently-cased
variant of the same header exists a few lines below Consent-Id),
PSD2-CERT, and TPP-Signature-Certificate.

Why this breaks under HTTP/2: RFC 7540 §8.1.2 requires HTTP/2 header
field names to be sent in lowercase on the wire. Any HTTP/2 client — which
is most modern HTTP clients by default when talking to a server that
advertises h2 via ALPN — sends consent-jwt, not Consent-JWT. The
== comparison against the mixed-case literal never matches, so
hasConsentJWT/getConsentJWT return false/None even though the
header is present with the correct name and value. The request then falls
through to whatever the next auth branch is, and — in our case — ends up
with a generic OBP-20001: User not logged in instead of ever reaching
Consent.checkConsent/applyConsentRulesCommon, which made this
confusing to diagnose: none of the consent-specific debug logging in
ConsentUtil.scala ever fired, because that code path was never entered.

Reproduction, against a real instance with consents.allowed=true, a
consent already created via POST /obp/v5.1.0/my/consents/IMPLICIT and
successfully answered via POST /obp/v3.1.0/banks/BANK_ID/consents/CONSENT_ID/challenge
(consent status ACCEPTED, verified independently):

# Over HTTP/2 (curl's and most clients' default for an ALPN-h2 server)
curl "https://<host>/obp/v5.1.0/users/current/user_id" \
  -H "Consent-JWT: <the accepted consent's jwt>" \
  -H "Consumer-Key: <consumer key>"
# -> HTTP 401 {"code":401,"message":"OBP-20001: User not logged in. Authentication is required!"}

# Identical request, forced to HTTP/1.1
curl --http1.1 "https://<host>/obp/v5.1.0/users/current/user_id" \
  -H "Consent-JWT: <the same jwt>" \
  -H "Consumer-Key: <consumer key>"
# -> HTTP 200 {"user_id":"..."}

Same consent, same JWT, same headers — the only difference is the wire
casing HTTP/1.1 vs HTTP/2 puts on the header name, and that alone flips
the result between "not logged in" and a correctly resolved user.

Suggested fix: compare header names case-insensitively, the way
getRequestHeader() a few lines below already does it correctly
(_.name.toLowerCase == name.toLowerCase). Applies to at least
getConsentJWT, getConsentIdRequestHeaderValue, `getPSD2-CERT`,
and the Consent-ID variant — worth a broader grep across APIUtil.scala
for the same filter(_.name == RequestHeader...) pattern to catch any
others.

Environment: reproduced against openbankproject/obp-api:latest,
commit b5a5765a185d173392c9d9c8fe36a4381097d954 (current develop HEAD
as of 2026-09-16), Kubernetes (k3s), behind an ingress-nginx TLS
termination that negotiates HTTP/2 with clients — but the bug is in the
header comparison itself and is not specific to this deployment; any
HTTP/2 client hitting these endpoints on any OBP-API instance should
reproduce it the same way.