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[Bug] useSignupForm.ts: communityWebsite regex allows IP addresses and internal hostnames to pass validation before https:// is prepended

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@anshul23102 已经在做这个了。

开始于 2026年6月8日。

评估

难度
4/5
预计耗时
3-5 天
新手友好度
55/100
Issue 类型
缺陷
描述清晰度
基本清楚
活跃度
冷清
技术栈
typescript

调研方向

Start in src/features/Auth/v1/hooks/useSignupForm.ts at the communityWebsite field in signupSchema, and trace where its transformed value is consumed. Reproduce the listed IP-like and internal-hostname inputs, then verify that only safe HTTP(S) website values are accepted and private-range targets are rejected.

由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。

描述

Bug Summary

The communityWebsite field in signupSchema validates that the user input does not include http:// or https://, then prepends https:// in a .transform():

communityWebsite: z
  .string()
  .optional()
  .or(z.literal(""))
  .refine(
    (val) => !val || /^(?!https?:\/\/)([a-zA-Z0-9-]+\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,}(\/.*)?$/.test(val),
    { message: "Enter domain only (e.g. example.com)." }
  )
  .transform((val) => (val && val.trim() !== "" ? `https://${val}` : val)),

The regex ([a-zA-Z0-9-]+\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,} accepts:

  1. IP addresses with appended labels: 192.168.1.internal or 169.254.169.metadata pass the regex (the part before the dot is valid, and internal/metadata are valid TLD-like strings).
  2. Internal hostnames: my-server.local or admin.lan pass the regex and are transformed to https://my-server.local and https://admin.lan.
  3. Subdomains of attacker-controlled domains: internal.attacker.com trivially passes.

After .transform(), the result https://192.168.1.internal is stored as the community website. If the backend later fetches the URL for a preview (link unfurling) or renders it as a clickable link, internal network addresses could reach backend services.

Additionally, the regex requires at minimum [a-zA-Z]{2,} after the final dot, which accepts single-character country codes and invented TLDs not in any public suffix list. There is no allowlist of known TLDs.

Expected Behavior

After prepending https://, the resulting URL should be additionally validated against a safe URL allowlist (only http: and https: schemes, no private IP ranges). A simple check using new URL(transformed) and verifying hostname does not resolve to a private range would catch most cases.

Actual Behavior

Internal hostnames and IP-like addresses pass the communityWebsite regex and are stored with https:// prepended.

Affected File

src/features/Auth/v1/hooks/useSignupForm.ts, communityWebsite field.


@NexGenStudioDev I would like to work on this issue. Could you please assign/ it to me? Contributing under NSoC '26.

主要语言
TypeScript
星标
7
派生
17
PR 合并指标
30 天内没有已合并 PR

环境准备

从这里开始

  1. 先读完整个 Issue,再读项目的贡献指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库,在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request,并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

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