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[Feature] Content-level governance boundary — PII detection, prompt injection defense, and cost budgets for Bot tool arguments

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难度
5/5
预计耗时
一周以上
新手友好度
30/100
Issue 类型
功能
描述清晰度
基本清楚
活跃度
活跃
技术栈
typescript
领域
backend-api-design, security

调研方向

首先定位 issue 中描述的服务器网关流水线，尤其是 CEL 评估之后、计算机调用之前的节点，并检查现有的边界插件接口。比较建议的网关插件、边界预设和代理中间件入口点；当确定一条集成路径并定义其内容治理行为，且由适当的项目测试覆盖时，这项工作就完成了。

由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。

描述

Problem

OpenBot's gateway handles infrastructure-level governance brilliantly — CEL policies on browser URLs, file paths, shell commands, and MCP tool classification. But there's a gap at the content level:

  1. PII in tool arguments — A Bot can pass an SSN, credit card number, or email to a tool without the gateway noticing, because CEL evaluates tool.name and page.url, not the argument content itself.

  2. Prompt injection via tool inputs — If a retrieved document or user message contains "ignore previous instructions...", that flows through the AG-UI endpoint into the Bot's tool arguments. The gateway sees a valid tool call to a permitted target — the adversarial content is invisible to CEL.

  3. Per-session cost budgets — The gateway records actions but doesn't enforce cumulative spend limits. A Bot can loop tool calls indefinitely without hitting a cost ceiling.

  4. Secret leakage in arguments — A Bot might pass api_key=sk-abc123... as a tool argument. The gateway correctly redacts secrets from the audit trail, but doesn't prevent the call from executing with the secret in-flight.

Proposed Solution

Add a content-level governance evaluator that runs alongside CEL, inspecting the content of tool arguments (not just tool names and targets). This would fire between "policy evaluated" and "call the computer" in the gateway pipeline.

One implementation: TealTiger — deterministic, in-process, no LLM in the evaluation path, <2ms per check. Already provides:

Check What It Catches
PII detection SSN, credit card, email, phone in tool args
Secret detection API keys, tokens, credentials
Prompt injection Instruction override, DAN, delimiter injection, system prompt override (8 patterns)
Cost budget Cumulative session spend with hard-stop
Argument validation SQL injection, path traversal in tool inputs

It could integrate as:

Option A — Gateway plugin:

// In the server gateway, after CEL evaluation, before calling computer
const contentDecision = await tealtigerEvaluate({
  toolName: resolvedTarget.tool,
  arguments: resolvedTarget.input,
  botId: bot.id,
  sessionCost: auditRow.cumulativeCost,
});
if (contentDecision.action === "DENY") {
  return refuse(contentDecision.reason);
}

Option B — Boundary preset:
A preset at /admin/boundaries that enables content-level checks:

# Content governance preset
name: "Content Protection"
rules:
  - scope: tool_arguments
    check: pii
    action: deny
    categories: [ssn, credit_card, email]
  - scope: tool_arguments
    check: prompt_injection
    action: deny
  - scope: session
    check: cost_budget
    action: deny
    max_usd: 5.00

Option C — Agent-level middleware:
The AG-UI agent (LangGraph, etc.) wraps itself with TealTiger middleware before registering as a Bot endpoint. Content governance happens inside the agent, infrastructure governance happens at the gateway. Defense-in-depth.

Use Cases
  • Financial services Bot handling account data — must not leak PII in tool arguments to third-party MCP servers
  • Research Bot consuming external documents — needs injection defense before those documents influence tool calls
  • Multi-Bot deployment with cost allocation — each Bot needs a per-session budget that hard-stops regardless of CEL rules
  • Compliance audit — need evidence that content-level checks were evaluated (not just that the URL/tool was permitted)
Why not just extend CEL?

CEL is great for structural checks (tool.name == "browser_navigate" && page.host != "internal.company.com"). But content scanning requires:

  • Regex pattern matching across variable-length text (PII/injection)
  • Stateful tracking (cumulative cost)
  • Confidence thresholds (injection detection isn't binary)

These are better served by a purpose-built content evaluator running alongside CEL rather than shoehorning them into CEL expressions.

Additional Context
  • TealTiger: https://github.com/agentguard-ai/tealtiger (Apache 2.0)
  • Already integrated with AG2 (built-in), Haystack, LangChain, CrewAI, Strands
  • NVIDIA Inception member
  • No external server required — runs in-process
  • Happy to contribute a PR once the boundary plugin interface stabilizes

This is complementary to existing governance, not a replacement. CEL handles infrastructure boundaries. Content evaluation handles what's inside the calls that pass those boundaries.

主要语言
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环境准备

  • 提供 Dockerfile 或 Docker Compose 文件
  • 有 Pull Request 模板
  • 没有贡献指南

从这里开始

  1. 先读完整个 Issue，再读项目的贡献指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库，在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request，并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

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