Sign PyPI releases

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还没有人认领这个 Issue。

评估

难度
4/5
预计耗时
3-5 天
新手友好度
15/100
Issue 类型
功能
描述清晰度
基本清楚
活跃度
停滞
技术栈
python
领域
release, security

调研方向

The payload names no files, so start by reading how the package is published to PyPI in this repository's release setup. The issue offers two options: signing uploads with twine --sign, or publishing a GPG-signed list of file hashes for pip install --hash. Pick one only after the maintainers agree on it, since the thread has no decision. Done means a documented, verifiable signing step that a maintainer has accepted.

由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。

描述

enhancement

Describe the bug

When a user downloads this python module using pip, there is no cryptographic authenticity or integrity validation to protect the user from a MITM attack.

Therefore, this project is making any other projects that obtain the b2 module via pip in their build process vulnerable to a watering hole attack.

Expected behavior

A developer should have a mechanism to cryptographically verify the integrity and authenticity of b2 when obtaining it through pip.

To Reproduce

pip install b2

Additional context

Possible solutions include:

  1. Using the --sign argument of twine when uploading packages to PyPI

  2. Publishing a cryptographically signed document (ideally using gpg) listing the hashes for all packages uploaded to PyPI, which users can then pass into pip using the --hash argument

主要语言
Python
星标
638
派生
138
平均合并
8 小时 27 分钟
30 天内合并 PR
8

环境准备

  • 没有 Dockerfile 或 Docker Compose 文件
  • 没有 Pull Request 模板
  • 阅读贡献指南

从这里开始

  1. 先读完整个 Issue，再读项目的贡献指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
  3. Fork 仓库，在一个分支上完成修改。
  4. 提交 Pull Request，并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。

Backblaze/B2_Command_Line_Tool 的其他 Issue

查看 Backblaze/B2_Command_Line_Tool 的全部 Issue

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