[Bug] Potential command injection risk in auto_assign_reviewers GitHub Actions workflow
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
還沒有人認領這個 Issue。
評估
- 難度
- 4/5
- 預估耗時
- 3-5 天
- 新手友好度
- 48/100
研究方向
先檢視 .github/workflows/auto_assign_reviewers.yml,追蹤從 pull_request_target 事件開始,經過中間映射與 shell 求值的已變更檔案中繼資料。將不安全的處理替換為不會根據檔名建構 shell 程式碼的方式,然後驗證不受信任的 pull request 無法注入指令,同時維持必要的 reviewer 指派行為與權限不變。
由索引模型根據 Issue 內容生成。
描述
RT-Thread Version
master branch, commit 630f4fa7a37ca99af5952946eea327cf9f1df21c Affected file: .github/workflows/auto_assign_reviewers.yml
Hardware Type/Architectures
Not hardware-specific. This issue affects a GitHub Actions workflow in the repository, not a specific BSP, board, MCU, or CPU architecture.
Develop Toolchain
Other
Describe the bug
This is a security-sensitive GitHub Actions workflow issue. I am intentionally not including the full PoC payload in this public issue. I can provide the detailed validation case privately to the maintainers if needed.
Summary
The affected workflow appears to be:
.github/workflows/auto_assign_reviewers.yml
The workflow processes pull request changed-file metadata in a pull_request_target context. The changed file names are attacker-controlled input. The workflow then stores these file names in an intermediate mapping and later reconstructs shell data structures from that mapping using shell evaluation logic.
If pull request file names are not safely encoded before reaching shell evaluation, specially crafted file names may be interpreted as shell syntax. This can lead to command injection in the GitHub Actions workflow.
Current version checked
I checked the current master branch at:
630f4fa7a37ca99af5952946eea327cf9f1df21c
At this commit, the relevant workflow structure still appears to be present.
Security impact
If exploitable, an attacker who can open or update a pull request may be able to execute shell commands in the affected GitHub Actions workflow context.
This is security-relevant because the workflow runs under pull_request_target and has pull request write permission.
I did not attempt to read, print, exfiltrate, or use any token or secret. I also did not run a destructive test against the project infrastructure.
High-level technical indicators
The risky pattern appears to involve:
pull_request_targetworkflow trigger;- reading changed file names from pull request metadata;
- writing pull request file names into an intermediate mapping without sufficient encoding;
- reconstructing shell variables from that mapping using shell evaluation;
- running the workflow with
pull-requests: writepermission.
I am omitting the exact payload and reproduction filename from this public issue to avoid making the issue directly exploitable.
Suggested remediation
Possible remediation approaches:
- Avoid using shell
evalon data derived from pull request metadata. - Do not construct shell code from pull request file names.
- Treat all pull request file names as untrusted input.
- Use a safe JSON processing path, such as Python
jsonor directjqprocessing, instead of converting JSON data into shell assignments. - Safely encode or reject file names containing shell metacharacters before processing.
- Reduce permissions for jobs that process untrusted pull request metadata.
- Consider splitting the workflow into:
- a low-privilege job that computes reviewer information;
- a separate trusted job that performs pull request write operations only after consuming sanitized output.
Private details
I can provide maintainers with:
- exact source-to-sink explanation;
- affected workflow snippets;
- current commit evidence;
- non-destructive maintainer-side validation steps;
- full PoC details using a harmless marker only.
Please let me know the preferred way to share those details privately.
Other additional context
GitHub Actions workflow environment.
Relevant context:
- GitHub Actions
- pull_request_target event
- ubuntu-22.04 runner
- bash / jq based workflow scripts
- 主要語言
- C
- 星號
- 12.4k
- 分支
- 5.5k
- 平均合併
- 3 天 7 小時
- 30 天內合併 PR
- 79
環境準備
在瀏覽器裡用你自己的 GitHub 帳號啟動這個專案的開發容器。
- 沒有 Dockerfile 或 Docker Compose 檔案
- 有 Pull Request 範本
- 閱讀貢獻指南
從這裡開始
- 先讀完整個 Issue,再讀專案的貢獻指南。
- 在 Issue 下留言說明你要接手 —— 這能避免兩個人做同樣的事。
- Fork 儲存庫,在一個分支上完成修改。
- 送出 Pull Request,並在描述裡引用這個 Issue 編號。
RT-Thread/rt-thread 的其他 Issue
-
Arch: ARM/AArch64 Doc
難度 1/5 1 小時以內 新手友好度 90/100
RT-Thread/rt-thread#12082 · 1 則留言 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
-
bug
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 67/100
RT-Thread/rt-thread#11951 · 2 則留言 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
-
[Bug] [libc] timer_gettime 拆秒前将总纳秒截断为 uint32_t,剩余时间查询错误可能重新可做 @Yunlk 於 28 天前認領,目前沒有進行中的 PR。 未關閉in progress
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 68/100
RT-Thread/rt-thread#11924 · 7 則留言 · 已指派 1 人 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
-
[Bug] dfs_v2 tmpfs: ftruncate(fd, 0) frees the file buffer but reports success — use-after-free read/write and double free from a legal POSIX call可能已有人在做 @remukisama 於 33 天前認領。 未關閉in progress
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 78/100
RT-Thread/rt-thread#11902 · 4 則留言 · 已指派 1 人 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
-
[bsp][stm32][bluepill] README「快速上手」缺少重新生成 MDK 工程这一步,按文档操作无法编译通过可能重新可做 @moment-NEW 於 50 天前認領,目前沒有進行中的 PR。 未關閉in progress
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 75/100
RT-Thread/rt-thread#11818 · 4 則留言 · 已指派 1 人 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
查看 RT-Thread/rt-thread 的全部 Issue
相似的 Issue
-
Builder: a structure opened without calculation data shows the Diffraction (fibre) view by default未關閉bug
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 65/100
FriendsofECCE/ECCE#1245 · 1 則留言 ·
-
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 72/100
apache/nuttx-apps#4108 · 4 則留言 ·
維護者通常 1 天內回覆
-
bug
難度 1/5 1 小時以內 新手友好度 84/100
VirtualBox/virtualbox#996 ·
維護者通常 6 天內回覆
-
難度 1/5 1 小時以內 新手友好度 82/100
trezor/trezor-firmware#8357 ·
維護者通常 2 天內回覆
-
難度 2/5 1-3 小時 新手友好度 76/100
維護者通常 1 天內回覆