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Security: fromJson() performs unrestricted reflective field binding (mass assignment); Javadoc claims a non-existent allowlist

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Assessment

Difficulty
5/5
Estimated time
Over a week
Newbie friendliness
35/100
Issue type
Bug
Clarity
Mostly clear
Activity status
Active
Tech stack
java
Domain
api, security

Research direction

Start in src/main/java/org/json/JSONObject.java at fromJson(Class) and the static fromJson(String, Class), then compare deserialization with the serialize-side handling of transient fields and @JSONPropertyIgnore. Confirm the preferred binding policy with maintainers; done means the agreed security behavior is implemented, the Javadoc matches it, and the supplied reproduction no longer overwrites excluded fields.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.

Description

Active discussion

Summary

JSONObject.fromJson(Class) (and the static fromJson(String, Class)) in current master performs unrestricted reflective field binding from untrusted JSON — a classic mass-assignment primitive. It iterates every non-static declared field, calls field.setAccessible(true) unconditionally, and writes any field whose name matches a JSON key. There is:

  • no allowlist / registry (despite the Javadoc claiming one — see below),
  • no transient exclusion,
  • no honoring of the library's own @JSONPropertyIgnore opt-out (which is honored on the serialize side).

Filing as a normal issue because this API is not in any release yet (not in 20250517); ideally it's hardened or gated before it ships.

The Javadoc claims a protection that does not exist

The fromJson(Class) Javadoc states:

"Only classes that are explicitly supported and registered within the JSONObject context can be deserialized... This ensures that only a limited and controlled set of types can be instantiated from JSON for safety and predictability."

There is no such registry anywhere in the source. Every class with a no-arg constructor is eligible and every non-static field is writable.

Code (src/main/java/org/json/JSONObject.java, fromJson(Class))

T obj = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor().newInstance();
for (Field field : clazz.getDeclaredFields()) {
    if (Modifier.isStatic(field.getModifiers())) {
        continue;                 // ONLY static is skipped
    }
    field.setAccessible(true);    // unconditional
    String fieldName = field.getName();
    if (has(fieldName)) {
        Object value = get(fieldName);
        Object convertedValue = convertValue(value, field.getGenericType());
        field.set(obj, convertedValue);   // writes transient / private / @JSONPropertyIgnore fields
    }
}

Reproduction

import org.json.JSONObject;
import org.json.JSONPropertyIgnore;

public class Repro {
    public static class UserUpdate {
        public String displayName;
        private boolean admin = false;
        private String tenantId = "own-tenant";
        private transient String sessionKey = "server-issued";
        private boolean superAdmin = false;

        public boolean isAdmin() { return admin; }
        public String getTenantId() { return tenantId; }
        public String getSessionKey() { return sessionKey; }
        @JSONPropertyIgnore
        public boolean isSuperAdmin() { return superAdmin; }
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        String json = "{\"displayName\":\"bob\",\"admin\":true,\"tenantId\":\"victim-tenant\","
                + "\"sessionKey\":\"attacker-supplied\",\"superAdmin\":true}";
        UserUpdate u = JSONObject.fromJson(json, UserUpdate.class);
        System.out.println("admin=" + u.isAdmin() + " tenantId=" + u.getTenantId()
                + " sessionKey=" + u.getSessionKey() + " superAdmin=" + u.isSuperAdmin());
    }
}

Output:

admin=true tenantId=victim-tenant sessionKey=attacker-supplied superAdmin=true

A private boolean admin, a private String tenantId, a transient sessionKey, and a @JSONPropertyIgnore-annotated superAdmin are all overwritten from untrusted JSON and observable through the object's own getters.

Why this matters

If fromJson(requestBody, SomePojo.class) is used the way the API documents, an anonymous caller can set fields the developer never meant to expose — privilege flags, tenant-isolation fields, or values explicitly marked transient/@JSONPropertyIgnore — the same class of bug as the Rails attr_accessible and Spring DataBinder mass-assignment issues.

Suggested fix

  • Skip transient fields (Modifier.isTransient), matching the serialize side.
  • Honor @JSONPropertyIgnore (or a field-level ignore) on deserialize.
  • Don't unconditionally setAccessible(true); default to public fields or require an explicit opt-in for private-field binding.
  • Fix the Javadoc so it no longer claims a registry/allowlist that isn't implemented.

Happy to open a PR if the maintainers agree on the preferred approach (skip transient + honor @JSONPropertyIgnore, vs. an opt-in binding model).

Dominant language
Java
Stars
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Forks
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Avg merge
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Merged PRs (30d)
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