Go: Why is DotDotCheck modeled as a complete path-injection barrier?

Comece com DotDotCheck em TaintedPathCustomizations.qll (linhas 106-122), depois inspecione o caso GOOD na linha 31 de TaintedPath.go e os testes da consulta de injeção de caminho do Go. Verifique como o ramo false se torna um isBarrier por meio de SanitizerGuardAsSanitizer e compare o comportamento pretendido com as orientações de filepath.Base. Considera-se concluído quando o modelo e as expectativas dos testes afetados refletirem de forma consistente a proteção compatível contra path traversal.

Description of the issue

The Go go/path-injection query treats !strings.Contains(path, "..") as a complete path-injection sanitizer. This means that when Contains returns false, taint is fully blocked - no additional sanitizer is required.

I'm wondering why this is modeled as a complete barrier, because checking for the absence of ".." does not prevent absolute-path attacks. For example, /etc/passwd does not contain "..", passes the guard, and can read files outside any intended directory.

The query help seems to agree - it says this approach is "only suitable if the input is expected to be a single file name", and also warns that user-controlled paths "may be absolute paths". But DotDotCheck doesn't distinguish between single-component inputs and multi-component paths.

The existing test case at TaintedPath.go line 31 marks this pattern as GOOD with the comment "This can only read inside the provided safe path", but tainted_path = "/etc/passwd" would still pass the check and escape any safe path.

Affected sanitizer

DotDotCheck in TaintedPathCustomizations.qll (lines 106-122) matches strings.Contains(p, "..") and declares the false branch as a complete sanitizer guard. Through SanitizerGuardAsSanitizer, this becomes a full isBarrier node.

Steps to reproduce

func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    p := r.URL.Query().Get("file")
    if !strings.Contains(p, "..") {
        data, _ := ioutil.ReadFile(p)  // 0 alerts with DotDotCheck enabled
        w.Write(data)
    }
}

Question

Given that !strings.Contains(p, "..") only blocks one specific attack vector and not absolute paths, would it be more appropriate to model it as a non-barrier (or at least not a complete one), similar to how filepath.Base is documented as "not a sanitizer for path traversal" in mime.multipart.model.yml?

Environment

• CodeQL CLI 2.25.6
• CodeQL repository commit: f6f45d1536312f53eed079868e344a5906bf3d72
• Go 1.22.12 on Linux/amd64