OAuth discovery rejects cross-origin resource_metadata from WWW-Authenticate, breaking centralized PRM (SEP-985) deployments
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Assessment
- Difficulty
- 3/5
- Estimated time
- 1-2 days
- Newbie friendliness
- 74/100
- Issue type
- Bug
- Clarity
- Clearly specified
- Activity status
- Active
- Tech stack
- rust
- Domain
- api, authentication, security
Research direction
Start in crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs at AuthorizationManager::resolve_resource_metadata_url, then trace discover_metadata and the OAuthState discovery flow. Reproduce the three-server cross-origin topology described in the issue and inspect the existing is_disallowed_metadata_host handling. Done means a permitted cross-origin resource_metadata URL is fetched, its authorization_servers value is used, and disallowed metadata hosts remain blocked.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Description
Describe the bug
AuthorizationManager::resolve_resource_metadata_url (crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs) unconditionally discards a resource_metadata URL from a WWW-Authenticate challenge when it is not same-origin (scheme+host+port) with the MCP resource:
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/blob/main/crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs
fn resolve_resource_metadata_url(value: &str, base_url: &Url) -> Option<Url> {
...
if Self::is_same_origin_resource_metadata_url(base_url, &url) {
Some(url)
} else {
warn!("rejecting resource metadata URL `{url}` because it is not same-origin with `{base_url}`");
None
}
}
This check was introduced in #935 (SSRF hardening) and is still present, unchanged and with no opt-out, on main today.
SEP-985 (tracked in #517, closed as implemented) explicitly asks the SDK to support protected-resource-metadata discovery via the resource_metadata parameter in the WWW-Authenticate challenge. That parameter is designed to point at a centralized protected-resource-metadata (PRM) endpoint, which is commonly on a different origin than the MCP resource itself — one PRM host serving metadata for many resource servers, each of which then names its own (also possibly different-origin) authorization server. The same-origin check added in #935 rejects exactly this shape unconditionally, before the authorization_servers value is ever read. There is currently no way to opt into accepting a cross-origin resource_metadata pointer — no builder method, no flag, nothing in AuthorizationManager or OAuthState addresses this specific check.
To Reproduce
Steps to reproduce the behavior:
- Stand up a resource server that returns
401withWWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="<url on a different origin than the resource>". - Have that URL serve valid protected-resource metadata naming an
authorization_serversentry (on any origin). - Call
AuthorizationManager::discover_metadata()(or the equivalentOAuthStatediscovery flow) against the resource. - Observe that
resolve_resource_metadata_urllogsrejecting resource metadata URL ... because it is not same-originand discovery falls through without ever fetching the PRM document or the authorization server metadata.
A self-contained, dependency-free Python reproducer using three loopback-only mock servers (resource / centralized PRM / authorization server) that mirrors this exact topology is available here: https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/42427#issuecomment-5519770828
A real-world case with no mocks: https://api.anthropic.com/v1/design/mcp advertises resource_metadata at https://api.anthropic.com/v1/design/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource, which in turn names https://claude.ai/v1/design/mcp as the authorization server — a different origin from the MCP resource.
Expected behavior
The resource_metadata URL should be followed regardless of origin (subject to the same SSRF allowlist/denylist already applied to authorization-server metadata URLs, e.g. is_disallowed_metadata_host), so that a legitimate centralized PRM host — the deployment shape SEP-985 was written to support — resolves its authorization_servers and completes discovery, instead of being discarded unconditionally.
Logs
[rmcp] warn: rejecting resource metadata URL `https://<prm-host>/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` because it is not same-origin with `https://<resource-host>/mcp`
Downstream effect in a consuming client (openai/codex), also blocked by this: https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/42427
Additional context
- This is blocking OAuth login in
openai/codex, which uses this SDK for its MCP OAuth client. Claude Code and Qwen Code both complete OAuth against theapi.anthropic.com/claude.aiexample above; Codex cannot, purely because this SDK never reaches the point of readingauthorization_servers. - Suggested fix: rather than a binary same-origin requirement on the
resource_metadataURL itself, apply the same SSRF allowlist/denylist already used for authorization-server metadata URLs (is_disallowed_metadata_host) to the resolvedresource_metadataURL as well. That preserves the SSRF protection #935 was added for while allowing the legitimate cross-origin PRM case.
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