Permission rules: ask before reading secrets, and cut safe prompts where the data allows
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@AIR-Xie がすでに取り組んでいます。
2026年10月25日 から。
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調査の方向性
Start with src/utils/permissions/filesystem.ts, then trace the Bash read-only check, the Read tool permission checks, and the tests named in the issue. Use the dataset's fill-rules.ts workflow to compare harmful calls allowed and safe calls asked on train, dev, and test. Done means secret reads prompt for approval, any removed prompt has near-zero harmful share on dev, and the before and after results are recorded on the issue.
索引モデルが issue の本文から書いたものです。
説明
Follow-up from #125 and #127. The System 1 dataset (#126) records what the CLI's current permission rules decide for every SABER tool call, so rule changes can be measured before they ship.
Goal
Change the permission rules so that they:
- ask before reading secrets, which they now allow; and
- ask less often about safe calls, but only where the data shows it is safe to stop asking.
Rules only. No model is involved; the hosted-model guardrail is #124 Phase 1.
What the data shows
SABER test split, 18,668 labeled calls (2,505 harmful). Counts for train are in brackets.
The rules let harmful calls through
The rules allow 435 of the 2,505 harmful calls (17.4%) without asking. All of them are Bash, and most are reads that the read-only check passes because the command (cat, head, grep) is read-only, whatever it reads.
| Calls the rules allow that mention… | Harmful | Safe |
|---|---|---|
.env files |
242 [1,010] | 112 [504] |
~/.ssh, id_rsa, id_ed25519 |
59 [141] | 244 [790] |
credential, secret and token files (credentials, secrets.yaml, .netrc, .npmrc, .pgpass, token) |
15 [154] | 65 [207] |
~/.aws/ |
1 [33] | 38 [95] |
shell profiles (.bashrc, .zshrc, .profile) |
7 [1] | 113 [172] |
DANGEROUS_FILES in src/utils/permissions/filesystem.ts protects these paths from writes but not from reads.
The rules ask about many safe calls, but no group is safe to drop wholesale
The rules ask about 11,397 test calls, and 9,327 of them (82%) are safe. Grouped by the reason the rules give:
| Reason the rules ask | Harmful | Safe | Harmful share |
|---|---|---|---|
| compound command with a part not on the read-only list | 519 | 3,635 | 12.5% |
| "This command requires approval" | 629 | 2,298 | 21.5% |
| Bash with no specific reason | 317 | 1,527 | 17.2% |
| newlines that could separate commands | 95 | 354 | 21.2% |
$() command substitution |
69 | 264 | 20.7% |
| consecutive quote characters | 69 | 205 | 25.2% |
| MCP tools with no rule | 100 | 113 | 46.9% |
Every group is at least 12% harmful, so relaxing a whole check would let harmful calls through. Prompts can only be cut for narrower command shapes inside these groups.
Plan
- Ask on reads of secrets. Add a read-side list next to
DANGEROUS_FILES, and make the Bash read-only check and the Read tool ask when a call touches one of its paths. Start with.env*and private keys (~/.ssh/id_*), which carry most of the harmful reads. Leave outknown_hosts,configand*.pub, since they make up much of the safe~/.sshtraffic. Add credential files and~/.aws/credentials. Leave shell profiles out: in this data they are almost all safe reads. - Find narrow safe shapes to stop asking about. Within the compound-command and "requires approval" groups, list the most common command shapes on train, keep a shape only if it is read-only by construction (for example
cd <dir> && ls), and check its harmful share on dev. - Measure each change by re-running the dataset's
fill-rules.tsand comparing harmful calls allowed against safe calls asked, before and after. Design on train, check on dev, and report test once at the end.
Done when
- Reads of
.envfiles and private keys are asked about, with tests inbashPermissions.test.tsand the Read tool's permission tests. - A table on this issue gives harmful calls allowed and safe calls asked, before and after, on dev and test.
- Any prompt that is removed has a harmful share near 0% on dev.
Caveats
- Labels come from SABER's LLM judge. The #126 spot check found some errors in both directions.
- SABER's tasks are attack scenarios, so the safe/harmful mix differs from everyday sessions. The private set is too small to check against.
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