Optional in-memory viewer mode to avoid exposing plaintext to external apps

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Valutazione

Difficoltà
5/5
Tempo stimato
Più di una settimana
Idoneità per principianti
12/100
Tipo di issue
Funzionalità
Chiarezza
Da chiarire
Stato di attività
Attiva
Stack tecnologico
c
Ambito
cryptography, security

Direzione di ricerca

This is a design proposal that names no specific source files or tests, so there is no code entry point yet. Start by reading the existing screen-capture protection and sensitive-buffer handling the issue mentions, then ask the maintainers whether they want a design doc. Done means an agreed scope and sandboxing decision, not a patch.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.

Descrizione

When you mount a volume, that part is solid. But the moment you open a file
with an external app — image viewer, PDF reader, media player — VeraCrypt
loses all control over it. That app can cache a thumbnail, write a temp file,
add the filename to a recent-files list, or just let the OS page its
unlocked memory to swap. None of that is VeraCrypt's fault, but in practice
the confidentiality guarantee mostly disappears the moment you actually use
the files instead of just mounting the container.

The screen capture protection you added recently protects VeraCrypt's own
window, but not whatever app ends up opening the file. Hidden volumes solve
a different problem (deniability, not this). Mounting to a RAM disk doesn't
help either — external programs reading from it still behave exactly the
same way.

What I'm proposing: an optional mode where the user can browse the file list
straight from VeraCrypt, and opening a file decrypts it directly into a
locked memory buffer shown through small built-in viewers (text, images,
PDF) — no external process, no mounted path, nothing for the OS to cache or
index. Memory handled the same way you already handle sensitive buffers:
locked, zeroed on close, no core dumps while live.

I know this isn't free. Putting image/PDF parsers inside a security-critical
process is real attack surface — parser bugs are one of the biggest sources
of CVEs in general (libpng, pdfium, etc.). If you ever build this, I'd start
small — text, one image format, basic PDF — and honestly the parsing should
probably run in a separate sandboxed process talking to the core over a
narrow channel, not inside the privileged code. Video/audio without ever
touching disk is genuinely hard cross-platform (decoders usually want a real
file handle), so I'd leave that out of a first version entirely.

This wouldn't replace mount-as-drive, which is still needed for anything
that does real file I/O. It's for the specific case of looking at a handful
of sensitive files without ever handing them to anything outside VeraCrypt.

I built a working proof of concept doing this end-to-end (Python, not
proposing the code itself gets used, just showing it's doable): double-layer
AES-GCM+CBC container kept fully in RAM, locked/zeroed memory, built-in
viewers for images/PDF/text/audio/video, screen capture protection on every
window. Repo: https://github.com/zmykerd/bcypherpy

Before I spend time on an actual design doc scoped to your codebase — is
this a direction you'd consider, or is the sandboxing requirement a
dealbreaker for maintenance reasons?

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