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RUSTSEC-2026-0342: Zero-length DATAGRAM frames bypass the receive buffer limit in quinn-proto

Aperta
#16 0 commenti 0 reazioni 0 assegnatari Vedi su GitHub

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Valutazione

Difficoltà
4/5
Tempo stimato
3-5 giorni
Idoneità per principianti
15/100
Tipo di issue
Bug
Chiarezza
Abbastanza chiara
Stato di attività
Attiva
Stack tecnologico
rust
Ambito
security

Direzione di ricerca

The report describes a vulnerability in the quinn-proto package, fixed in version 0.11.17, and links to the upstream pull request #2790. Start by reviewing that pull request and the RustSec advisory to understand the receive and send buffer accounting flaw. Done means confirming whether this repository is affected and addressing the vulnerable dependency or documenting why it is not applicable.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.

Descrizione

Zero-length DATAGRAM frames bypass the receive buffer limit in quinn-proto

Details
Package quinn-proto
Version 0.11.16
URL https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/pull/2790
Date 2026-08-17
Patched versions >=0.11.17
Unaffected versions <0.5.0

quinn-proto bounds its queue of received datagrams by charging each queued frame's payload length
against TransportConfig::datagram_receive_buffer_size, evicting the oldest datagrams when the
limit is exceeded. A DATAGRAM frame with an empty payload was charged zero bytes, so it never
triggered eviction and was appended to the queue, which has no other bound.

DATAGRAM frames are not subject to flow control. A peer that has completed the handshake can
therefore send a stream of empty DATAGRAM frames and grow the receiver's heap without limit until
the process is killed. An application that reads incoming datagrams but does so more slowly than
the peer sends them is still affected. Receiving datagrams is enabled by default, so all endpoints
that do not explicitly set datagram_receive_buffer_size(None) are affected.

The send path had the same accounting flaw: an application could enqueue an unbounded number of
empty outgoing datagrams without ever receiving SendDatagramError::Blocked.

The flaw was corrected in 0.11.17 by accounting for the fixed per-datagram overhead in both
directions, so that every queued datagram consumes buffer space.

Thanks to @alexpyattaev for reporting this issue.

See advisory page for additional details.

Lingua principale
Rust
Stelle
1
Fork
0
Merge medio
1g 15h
PR unite (30g)
3

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