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[Server] Bind Streamable HTTP sessions to the authenticated principal

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Valutazione

Difficoltà
4/5
Tempo stimato
3-5 giorni
Idoneità per principianti
32/100
Tipo di issue
Funzionalità
Chiarezza
Abbastanza chiara
Stato di attività
Attiva
Stack tecnologico
php
Ambito
api, authentication, backend, security

Direzione di ricerca

Start from Protocol::resolveSession() and StreamableHttpTransport session load/destroy (Mcp-Session-Id, sessionManager exists/createWithId/destroySession) plus AuthorizationMiddleware. The issue wants a stable identity fingerprint stored on initialize and compared on later POST/DELETE (404 on mismatch). Read the linked MCP session-hijacking guidance, then decide with maintainers the open questions (always vs opt-in, Protocol vs store keying, opaque tokens) before coding; done is sessions bound to the principal without accepting another valid token on the same ID.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.

Descrizione

Server

Currently a stateful StreamableHttpTransport session is resolved only by its Mcp-Session-Id header - Protocol::resolveSession() checks sessionManager->exists() and loads it with createWithId(), and DELETE goes straight to destroySession(). With AuthorizationMiddleware in front, every request is still authenticated with the caller's own token and scopes are not inherited, but the session doesn't know which principal created it. So a request with a different valid token and the same session ID is accepted into that session, DELETE included.

Session IDs are random UUIDs, so this isn't easy to hit - still, the spec's security best practices say servers SHOULD bind session IDs to user-specific information: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices#session-hijacking (the draft has the same as "state handle hijacking").

Thanks @GEONWOOHAN for bringing this up.

Rough direction:

  • AuthorizationResult exposes a stable identity - issuer + subject rather than sub alone, maybe the client id as well
  • the transport passes that into session resolution
  • on initialize we store a fingerprint of it in the session, later POST/DELETE compare and answer 404 on mismatch

Open questions:
a) bind always when an identity is present, or opt-in via the builder?
b) does it belong into Protocol or rather the session manager / store, so a custom store can key on <principal>:<session id>?
c) what about validators that don't produce a subject (opaque tokens, API keys)?

Keeping the core unaware of OAuth would be nice, so probably a plain identity string rather than the auth result itself.

WDYT?

Lingua principale
PHP
Stelle
1.6k
Fork
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Merge medio
3g 1h
PR unite (30g)
27

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