release: sign SHA256SUMS so --upgrade checks where the files come from

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#186 0 commenti 0 reazioni 0 assegnatari Vedi su GitHub

I maintainer di solito rispondono entro 2 giorni

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Valutazione

Difficoltà
5/5
Tempo stimato
Più di una settimana
Idoneità per principianti
35/100
Tipo di issue
Funzionalità
Chiarezza
Abbastanza chiara
Stato di attività
Attiva
Stack tecnologico
bash, github-actions
Ambito
release, security

Direzione di ricerca

Read .github/workflows/release.yml, server-prep.sh, SECURITY.md, the README, and tests/upgrade.sh. First, resolve the maintainer choice between minisign/signify and GitHub artifact attestations, then trace the existing --upgrade checksum flow. Done when releases provide verifiable provenance, upgrades check it and reject invalid results, the docs explain manual verification, and tests cover valid and invalid signatures.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.

Descrizione

claude enhancement priority: medium size: M

What

Sign the release checksums, so server-prep.sh --upgrade (and anyone who downloads a release by hand) can check that the files really come from the maintainers, not only that the download is complete.

Why

Today SHA256SUMS is downloaded from the same GitHub release as the scripts, over the same HTTPS connection. It catches a broken or truncated download, and a single swapped file. It does not help when someone can replace files in a release: they can replace SHA256SUMS too (for example with a compromised GitHub account, a stolen release key, or a tampered release run). This is the same trust as a manual download, so nothing got worse, and the docs now say so plainly (raised in the review of exceev-consulting/server-prep#183).

Options

  1. minisign (or signify): the release workflow (or a maintainer) signs SHA256SUMS with a key kept outside GitHub, and the public key is written in the scripts and the README. --upgrade checks SHA256SUMS.minisig before anything else when minisign is installed, and says clearly when it cannot.
  2. GitHub artifact attestations: the release workflow publishes a provenance attestation for each file, and --upgrade runs gh attestation verify when gh is present. No key to keep, but it still trusts GitHub itself.

Both change .github/workflows/release.yml, so this needs a maintainer's choice first.

Done when

  • A release carries a signature (or attestation) for its files.
  • --upgrade checks it when the tool is present, refuses a bad one, and says what it checked.
  • SECURITY.md and the README say how to check a manual download the same way.
  • tests/upgrade.sh covers a good and a bad signature with the fake release.
Lingua principale
Shell
Stelle
2
Fork
3
Merge medio
2g 14m
PR unite (30g)
47

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