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STSAFEA-120: AES CCM Start Decryption command ends up in invalid RMAC if no counter associated to the key

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Valutazione

Difficoltà
3/5
Tempo stimato
1-2 giorni
Idoneità per principianti
65/100
Tipo di issue
Bug
Chiarezza
Abbastanza chiara
Stato di attività
Attiva
Stack tecnologico
c

Direzione di ricerca

Start at the stsafea_aes_ccm_decrypt_start response-frame construction and trace how the optional counter element is read when response encryption is enabled. Exercise the no-counter and counter-associated cases with and without a counter buffer; done means RMAC verification succeeds and counter data is handled according to the counter-presence flag.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.

Descrizione

Normally, start CCM decryption response looks like this:

  • Plaintext
  • Bit of counter presence + 7 bits of padding
  • Counter value.

However, according to user manual, counter value is present in response message only when such counter is associated with used key.
In stsafea_aes_ccm_decrypt_start, frame element for counter value is always allocated.

It is not a problem when no response encryption is used, just this frame element receives some random value from I2C buffer.
Normally, user don't call this function with the counter buffer pointer, this frame element data just ends up in alt_counter variable and gets discarded.

But, if response encryption is used, things get complicated. In this case, RMAC is added right after the last message element.
In result, such RMAC is read as counter value and gets discarded. RMAC verification uses 4 bytes after "counter" bytes in response frame, which are some residues in I2C buffer after previous commands and verification fails.

Moreover, in case when key has associated counter and user calls this function without pointer to counter buffer, counter value just gets discarded.
It means that user will receive some encrypted data, but nonce will be incorrect.
So, normally user is supposed to know key information (and counter presence) before starting the encryption.

Based on this assumption, I propose the following solution:

stse_ReturnCode_t stsafea_aes_ccm_encrypt_start(
    stse_Handler_t *pSTSE,
    PLAT_UI8 slot_number,
    PLAT_UI16 Nonce_length,
    PLAT_UI8 *pNonce,
    PLAT_UI16 total_associated_data_length,
    PLAT_UI32 total_message_length,
    PLAT_UI16 associated_data_chunk_length,
    PLAT_UI8 *pAssociated_data_chunk,
    PLAT_UI16 message_chunk_length,
    PLAT_UI8 *pPlaintext_message_chunk,
    PLAT_UI8 *pEncrypted_message_chunk,
    PLAT_UI8 *pCounter_presence,
    PLAT_UI32 *pCounter) {
    stse_ReturnCode_t ret;
    PLAT_UI8 cmd_header[STSAFEA_EXT_HEADER_SIZE] = {STSAFEA_EXTENDED_COMMAND_PREFIX, STSAFEA_EXTENDED_CMD_START_ENCRYPT};

    PLAT_UI8 rsp_header;
    PLAT_UI8 alt_counter_presence;

    /* - Check stsafe handler initialization */
    if (pSTSE == NULL) {
        return (STSE_SERVICE_HANDLER_NOT_INITIALISED);
    }

    if ((pNonce == NULL) ||
        (pAssociated_data_chunk == NULL && associated_data_chunk_length != 0) ||
        (pAssociated_data_chunk != NULL && associated_data_chunk_length == 0) ||
        (pPlaintext_message_chunk == NULL && message_chunk_length != 0) ||
        (pPlaintext_message_chunk != NULL && message_chunk_length == 0) ||
        (pEncrypted_message_chunk == NULL && message_chunk_length != 0) ||
        (pEncrypted_message_chunk != NULL && message_chunk_length == 0)) {
        return (STSE_SERVICE_INVALID_PARAMETER);
    }
/
    /* - Prepare CMD Frame */
    stse_frame_allocate(CmdFrame);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eCmd_header, STSAFEA_EXT_HEADER_SIZE, cmd_header);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eSlot_number, 1, &slot_number);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eNonce_length, STSAFEA_GENERIC_LENGTH_SIZE, (PLAT_UI8 *)&Nonce_length);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eNonce, Nonce_length, pNonce);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eTotal_associated_data_length, STSAFEA_GENERIC_LENGTH_SIZE, (PLAT_UI8 *)&total_associated_data_length);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eTotal_message_length, 4, (PLAT_UI8 *)&total_message_length);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eAssociated_data_length, STSAFEA_GENERIC_LENGTH_SIZE, (PLAT_UI8 *)&associated_data_chunk_length);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eAssociated_data, associated_data_chunk_length, pAssociated_data_chunk);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, eMessage_length, STSAFEA_GENERIC_LENGTH_SIZE, (PLAT_UI8 *)&message_chunk_length);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&CmdFrame, ePlaintext_message, message_chunk_length, pPlaintext_message_chunk);

    /* - Prepare RSP Frame */
    stse_frame_allocate(RspFrame);
y    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&RspFrame, eRsp_header, STSAFEA_HEADER_SIZE, &rsp_header);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&RspFrame, eEncrypted_message, message_chunk_length, pEncrypted_message_chunk);
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&RspFrame, eCounter_presence, 1, pCounter_presence);
    // Presume that if user does not provide a buffer for counter the key does not have counter associated
    stse_frame_element_allocate_push(&RspFrame, eCounter, pCounter != NULL ? STSAFEA_COUNTER_VALUE_SIZE : 0, (PLAT_UI8 *)pCounter);

    if (pCounter_presence == NULL) {
        eCounter_presence.pData = &alt_counter_presence;
    }

    /* - Swap byte order */
    stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eNonce_length);
    stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eTotal_associated_data_length);
    stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eTotal_message_length);
    stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eAssociated_data_length);
    stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eMessage_length);

    /* - Perform Transfer*/
    ret = stsafea_frame_transfer(pSTSE,
                                 &CmdFrame,
                                 &RspFrame);

    if (*(pCounter_presence.Pdata) != 0) {
        if (pCounter != NULL) {
            stse_frame_element_swap_byte_order(&eCounter);
        } else {
            // Key have associated counter, but user did not provide buffer for it - it is an error
            ret = STSE_WRONG_KEY_TYPE;
        }
    }

    return ret;
}

Basically - if user does not provide buffer for counter - presume there's no associated counter, don't try to read it.
At the end of reception, check counter presence flag - if counter is present but user did not provide buffer - that's an error.

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