Arbitrary Stripe priceId accepted at three checkout endpoints → Pro entitlement bypass

Inizia da packages/utils/src/constants/plans.ts e confronta i tre punti di ingresso del checkout: le route guest-checkout, subscribe e desktop root. Leggi la validazione esistente in apps/web/app/api/v1/[...route]/route.ts e segui userIsPro, isProSubscription e la gestione dei webhook di Stripe. Il lavoro è completo quando i piani consentiti, le quantità limitate, l’autenticazione degli ospiti e i controlli dei diritti di accesso sono coperti in modo coerente lungo questi percorsi.

Summary

priceId and quantity are taken directly from client-supplied JSON and passed into
stripe.checkout.sessions.create with no allowlist, at three separate endpoints, despite
STRIPE_PLAN_IDS (packages/utils/src/constants/plans.ts) existing for exactly this purpose:

• apps/web/app/api/settings/billing/guest-checkout/route.ts:9,26 no auth at all.
• apps/web/app/api/settings/billing/subscribe/route.ts:14,68 authenticated, but no allowlist.
• apps/web/app/api/desktop/[...route]/root.ts:702-791 (POST /api/desktop/subscribe, used by
  desktop + mobile) authenticated via withAuth, but priceId is only validated as
  z.string(), no enum against STRIPE_PLAN_IDS.

For contrast, apps/web/app/api/v1/[...route]/route.ts:4402-4409 does this correctly: it
derives the price itself from STRIPE_PLAN_IDS[environment][payload.interval] and never
trusts a client-supplied price id.

Why this grants full Pro

Entitlement is checked by status, not by price:

• userIsPro (packages/utils/src/lib/stripe/subscriptions.ts) only checks
  stripeSubscriptionStatus / thirdPartyStripeSubscriptionId.
• isProSubscription is a deny-list it excludes only SSO and signed-BAA subscriptions.
• In the Stripe webhook (apps/web/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts:110-124,601-610),
  checkout.session.completed special-cases only SSO and signed-BAA subscriptions via
  isSsoSubscription/isSignedBaaSubscription. Every other subscription i.e. any other live
  recurring price on the account — falls into the generic path that sets
  stripeSubscriptionStatus: subscription.status and inviteQuota from the line-item quantity,
  with no price check at all.

So completing checkout with any other live recurring price in Cap's Stripe account (a
retired/legacy tier, an internal test price, anything not SSO/BAA) grants full Pro status.
allow_promotion_codes: true widens this further, and on subscribe/route.ts and
guest-checkout/route.ts an unbounded quantity flows straight into users.inviteQuota.

Existing related work (none of it closes this)

• PR #2141 (open, "Checkout conversion...guest checkout lockdown") fixes only
  guest-checkout/route.ts adds an allowedPriceIds() check against STRIPE_PLAN_IDS and
  clamps quantity to 1-100. subscribe/route.ts and the desktop /subscribe endpoint are
  untouched by that PR, and isProSubscription remains a deny-list.
• PR #1929 (open) adds Vercel-Firewall rate limiting to guest-checkout only doesn't prevent
  a single request from buying Pro at an arbitrary price, and fails open on self-hosted deploys
  without a configured Firewall rule.
• No existing issue covers this.

Fix

1. Allowlist priceId against STRIPE_PLAN_IDS[env] at all three endpoints (not just
   guest-checkout), mirroring the pattern already used in v1/route.ts.
2. Clamp quantity at subscribe/route.ts and the desktop endpoint the same way #2141 does
   for guest-checkout.
3. Convert isProSubscription from a deny-list to an allow-list (only prices in
   STRIPE_PLAN_IDS grant Pro), so entitlement isn't dependent on catching every non-Pro price
   individually as it's created in Stripe.
4. Require auth on guest-checkout or otherwise bound its blast radius (currently zero auth).

Caveat

Actual historical exposure depends on which legacy/test prices are live (non-archived) in Cap's
Stripe account right now someone with Stripe dashboard access should check before sizing
impact. The code-level flaw is independent of that and reproducible today with any second live
recurring price.