Hacktoberfest 2026 : les issues que les mainteneurs ont marquées pour octobre, ouvertes et accessibles aux débutants. Parcourir les issues Hacktoberfest

Python: Should an empty `netloc` count as a `py/url-redirection` sanitizer when `///evil.com` passes the check?

Ouverte
#22,846 0 commentaires 0 réactions 0 personnes assignées Voir sur GitHub

Les mainteneurs répondent en général sous 1 jour

Personne n'a encore pris cette issue.

Évaluation

Difficulté
4/5
Temps estimé
3-5 jours
Accessibilité débutants
52/100
Type d'issue
Bug
Clarté
Clairement spécifiée
Activité
Active
Stack technique
python
Domaine
security, testing-qa

Piste de recherche

Read python/ql/lib/semmle/python/frameworks/Stdlib/Urllib.qll around NetlocCheck, then inspect python/ql/src/Security/CWE-601/UrlRedirect.qhelp, redirect_good2.py, and the ok8 case in python/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-601-UrlRedirect/test.py. Reproduce the three-slash case and run the URL redirect query tests; done means the sanitizer, help example, and test annotations consistently account for the demonstrated bypass.

Rédigé par le modèle d'indexation à partir du texte de l'issue.

Description

question

Description of the issue

py/url-redirection treats a check that urlparse(target).netloc is empty as a sanitizer, and the query help recommends this check, together with an empty scheme, as a way to validate redirect targets. I'm wondering whether the check is meant to be complete, because for ///evil.com or ////evil.com, urlparse returns an empty scheme and an empty netloc, so the check passes, while browsers resolve the redirect to https://evil.com/.

Affected sanitizer

NetlocCheck treats a read of urlparse(...).netloc used as a condition, or compared with anything, as a barrier guard for the NoBackslashes state. The query help recommends it in redirect_good2.py, and ok8 in the query test annotates it # OK.

Steps to reproduce

The help example, unchanged:

from flask import Flask, request, redirect
from urllib.parse import urlparse

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/')
def hello():
    target = request.args.get('target', '')
    target = target.replace('\\', '')
    if not urlparse(target).netloc and not urlparse(target).scheme:
        # relative path, safe to redirect
        return redirect(target, code=302)
    # ignore the target and redirect to the home page
    return redirect('/', code=302)

The check from ok8, plus an unchecked redirect for comparison:

# Same check as `ok8` in python/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-601-UrlRedirect/test.py
from flask import Flask, request, redirect
from urllib.parse import urlparse

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/ok8')
def ok8():
    untrusted = request.args.get('target', '')
    untrusted = untrusted.replace("\\", "/")
    if not urlparse(untrusted).netloc:
        return redirect(untrusted, code=302) # OK
    return redirect("/", code=302)


@app.route('/bad')
def bad():
    return redirect(request.args.get('target', ''), code=302)  # control: reported

py/url-redirection (and python-security-extended.qls) reports only /bad. With Flask's test client, the help example produces these Location headers, and ok8 produces the same ones:

target Location
/home /home
https://evil.com /
//evil.com /
///evil.com ///evil.com
////evil.com ////evil.com

new URL("///evil.com", "https://example.com/login") and new URL("////evil.com", "https://example.com/login") both give https://evil.com/ (WHATWG URL parser, as used by browsers).

This looks related to #16041: #16646 added the scheme check to the help example for https:/example.com, but URLs without a scheme that start with three or more slashes still pass. Django's url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme, which the help recommends for Django, rejects them explicitly (django/utils/http.py: "Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but urlsplit is not so flexible. Treat any url with three slashes as unsafe.").

The check also occurs in real code: KindleEar#734 used the same netloc/scheme check as the help example (url_for(...) if parts.netloc or parts.scheme else nextUrl), and ////evil.com bypassed it. DeepBI#169 describes the same bypass of a urlsplit scheme/netloc check.

Question

Is NetlocCheck intended to treat scheme-less URLs that start with three or more slashes as safe? Would it be reasonable to keep the taint unless such URLs are also rejected, as Django does, and to update the help example and the ok8 annotation accordingly?

Environment

  • CodeQL CLI 2.27.2 (codeql/python-queries 1.8.12)
  • CodeQL repository commit for the links above: 781e068896eb7a1a104f1378e8f3f68a1074a015 (the files are unchanged since 2.27.2)
  • Python 3.10.12, Flask 3.0.0, Werkzeug 3.0.1; Node.js v24.18.0 for the URL resolution; Linux/amd64
Langage dominant
CodeQL
Étoiles
10.2k
Forks
2.1k
Merge moyen
2 j 18 h
PR mergées (30 j)
142

Préparer son environnement

Ouvrir dans Codespaces

Lance le conteneur de développement du projet dans votre navigateur, avec votre propre compte GitHub.

Par où commencer

  1. Lisez l'issue en entier, puis le guide de contribution du projet.
  2. Signalez en commentaire que vous la prenez — cela évite que deux personnes fassent le même travail.
  3. Forkez le dépôt et travaillez sur une branche.
  4. Ouvrez une pull request qui référence le numéro de l'issue.

Autres issues de github/codeql

Toutes les issues de github/codeql

Issues similaires

Plus d'issues Security

Recevez les nouvelles issues par e-mail

Un résumé court des issues GitHub adaptées aux débutants.