MCP broker: logins to protected MCP servers survive a mecak8s restart
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
Nadie ha tomado este issue todavía.
Evaluación
- Dificultad
- 5/5
- Tiempo estimado
- Más de una semana
- Aptitud para principiantes
- 35/100
- Tipo de issue
- Nueva funcionalidad
- Claridad
- Bien especificado
- Estado de actividad
- Activo
- Stack tecnológico
- go, helm, kubernetes, redis
- Área
- authentication, backend, infrastructure
Línea de trabajo
Start by tracing the MCP broker’s enrollment and login state, the embedded authorization server’s HMAC and signing key configuration, and the Redis and Helm settings mentioned in the issue; the payload does not name specific files or tests. Check how the identity broker configures its signing key under #2538, then map the restart and secret rotation requirements to existing entry points. Done means durable logins and refresh tokens survive restarts, previous configured secrets and keys verify tokens, and startup reports a clear error when durable logins lack required secrets.
Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.
Descripción
Depends on: nothing
Problem
When a protected (OAuth) MCP server is configured, mecak8s's MCP broker signs each user in to it through ToolHive's embedded authorization server (workspace enrollment). The broker keeps each session's enrollment, the tokens it obtained, and the state of logins in progress in memory. A mecak8s restart loses all of it, so every user has to log in to every protected MCP server again, and a login in progress during the restart fails.
Storing these in Redis is not enough on its own. The embedded authorization server generates a new HMAC secret (which protects its authorization codes and refresh tokens), a new signing key (which signs the access tokens the gateway accepts), and new credentials for the MCP broker's own client at every start. Anything stored before a restart is unusable after it.
The identity broker makes the embedded authorization server's signing key operator-supplied when it is on (#2538). This ticket covers the rest, with the identity broker off or on.
Requirements
- A user's login to a protected MCP server survives a mecak8s restart: the enrollment and the tokens it holds are stored durably (Redis), and a login in progress during a restart either completes or fails cleanly with a prompt to log in again.
- The embedded authorization server's HMAC secret is supplied by the operator: one current secret of at least 32 bytes, plus optional previous secrets accepted for verification only, for rotation.
- Its signing key is supplied by the operator, plus optional previous keys still published for verification. With the identity broker on this is the key #2538 already requires; both use one configuration shape.
- The MCP broker's own client at the embedded authorization server keeps the same identity across restarts.
- mecak8s refuses to start with durable logins enabled if any of these is missing. Without durable logins they stay optional, and behaviour is unchanged.
- Secrets are read from files mounted from Kubernetes Secrets, never logged, and exposed through the Helm chart.
Done when
- With the operator's secrets and Redis configured, a protected MCP server a user logged in to before a mecak8s restart is still callable after it, and its refresh token still renews, with no new login.
- A token issued under a previous secret or key is accepted while it is configured as previous, and refused once it is removed.
- mecak8s with durable logins on and a missing secret refuses to start with a clear error.
- With durable logins off, mecak8s starts and behaves as it does now, with no new settings required.
- Lenguaje dominante
- Go
- Estrellas
- 309
- Forks
- 29
- Merge medio
- 15 h 56 min
- PR fusionados (30 d)
- 225
Preparar el entorno
- Sin Dockerfile ni archivo de Docker Compose
- Tiene una plantilla de pull request
- Leer la guía de contribución
Primeros pasos
- Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
- Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
- Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
- Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.
Más de stacklok/mecatl
-
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 76/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 78/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
docs: make local provider configuration discoverable from mecatuiQuizá libre de nuevo @brainsparker la tomó hace 28 días y no hay ningún pull request abierto. Abiertodocumentation
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 73/100
stacklok/mecatl#2470 · 1 comentario ·
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 74/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
Flake: MCP handshake cancellation can outlive authorization send deadlinePosiblemente ocupada @jbeda la tomó hoy. Abierto
Dificultad 4/5 3-5 días Aptitud para principiantes 25/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
Todos los issues de stacklok/mecatl
Issues similares
-
HTTP probe loses insecureSkipVerify in the generated probe manifestPosiblemente ocupada @BahaaMattar la tomó hoy. Abierto
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 87/100
litmuschaos/litmus#5745 ·
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 2 días
-
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 74/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 2 días
-
type/bug
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 83/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
messaging/v1: IsGRPCProtocol and InternalMetadataToGrpcMetadata panic on empty or nil metadata valuesPosiblemente ocupada @patelshivani2283-lab la tomó hoy. Abierto
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 77/100
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día
-
needs-triage
Dificultad 2/5 1-3 horas Aptitud para principiantes 62/100
stacklok/toolhive-catalog#2024 ·
Los mantenedores suelen responder en 1 día