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[eu-cra-compliance:security-requirements-auditor] github/gh-aw-threat-detection CRA security requirements audit

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Evaluación

Dificultad
5/5
Tiempo estimado
Más de una semana
Aptitud para principiantes
25/100
Tipo de issue
Nueva funcionalidad
Claridad
Bastante claro
Estado de actividad
Activo
Stack tecnológico
github-actions
Área
security

Línea de trabajo

The issue identifies the approved technical tranche as R1, R6, and R9 and names github/gh-aw-threat-detection, CI, tagged releases, and make agent-finish; it does not identify specific files or tests. Start by reviewing the existing security scan and CI/release workflow, then map the requested threat model, scan gates, alert disposition process, and retained scan evidence to those entry points. Done means the approved tranche is implemented, its evidence is reviewable, and the requested focused acceptance checks pass.

Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.

Descripción

eu-cra-compliance eu-cra-compliance:security-requirements-auditor

The reviewed CLI has strong bounded-input, log-safety, test, and release-integrity controls, but the repository does not yet provide a CRA-specific risk assessment, enforced security scanning in CI/release, or an evidenced update-by-default design. Known-vulnerability status is incomplete because dependency and secret alert evidence was inaccessible; two high-severity code-scanning alerts remain open. This is implementation evidence, not a legal conformity decision.

Action: The security product owner should decide CRA scope, product/operator classification, and update applicability; maintainers should then assign the technical tranche below to Copilot and accept it only when security scans gate CI/release, alerts are dispositioned, and reviewed risk/update evidence is checked in.

Critical findings
  • R1 — GAP_FOUND: no product cybersecurity risk assessment or maintained threat model was found.
  • R2 — INCOMPLETE: dependency/secret alert APIs returned 403; absence of known exploitable vulnerabilities is not verified. Two open high-severity Opengrep alerts affect the generated smoke workflow.
  • R8 — GAP_FOUND: release/version-drift automation exists, but no evidenced product mechanism meets automatic-update, default-on, notice, opt-out, and postponement requirements where applicable.
  • R9 — GAP_FOUND: make security-scan exists, but CI and tagged release run tests/builds without gosec/govulncheck; open scan alerts are not release-gated.
<b>Verified regulatory baseline and assumptions</b>

Verified 2026-10-23 against the binding regulation at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj. Entry into force: 10 Dec 2024; Chapter IV: 11 Jun 2026; Article 14 reporting: 11 Sep 2026; general application: 11 Dec 2027 (Article 71). The requested 27 Jul 2026 Commission guidance baseline is INCOMPLETE: the official Commission entry point returned 403, so its date/content was not independently verified. Guidance is non-binding. ENISA material and any OJ-cited harmonised standard were not verified; no presumption of conformity is claimed.

Assumption for technical review only: the repository produces a downloadable open-source CLI and GitHub workflow component (latest observed release v0.5.2). Commercial/non-commercial FOSS treatment, manufacturer/economic-operator role, substantial modification, class, and market placement require human decisions.

<b>Requirement-to-evidence matrix</b>
ID Requirement / status Repository evidence Missing / limitation Priority recommendation
R1 Risk-based secure design/default — GAP_FOUND security specification; bounded/uninspectable inputs; fail-closed tests No CRA risk assessment, maintained threat model, abuse-case register, or secure-default rationale P0: version a risk/threat model mapped to architecture, tests, and releases
R2 No known exploitable vulnerabilities at placement — INCOMPLETE Dependabot for Actions; 2 open code alerts identified Dependency and secret alerts inaccessible; active exploitation not verified P0: authorized reviewer exports controlled alert evidence and dispositions open alerts before release
R3 Secure configuration/reset — HUMAN_REVIEW_REQUIRED strict input validation; 0600 atomic results; bounded time/turn controls Product defaults and reset-to-original-state applicability not assessed end-to-end Product owner decides applicability and records default/reset behavior
R4 Unauthorized access; confidentiality/integrity; minimization — EVIDENCE_SUFFICIENT allowlisted bounded activation metadata; reason redaction; workflow-command escaping; SHA-256 release verification Deployment identity, engine-token, and encryption controls are outside this checkout Preserve controls; link deployment evidence separately
R5 Availability, resilience, restoration — HUMAN_REVIEW_REQUIRED timeouts, cancellation, degraded-input warnings; documented release rollback Service dependencies, recovery objectives, and restoration tests not evidenced Operations owner decides applicability and supplies controlled recovery evidence
R6 Limit attack surface, impact, propagation — GAP_FOUND symlink/path-collision/oversize/malformed-input tests; least-privilege CI No architecture-level attack-surface/propagation analysis P1: add data-flow/trust-boundary and abuse-case coverage
R7 Security logging/monitoring/user visibility — EVIDENCE_SUFFICIENT bounded diagnostics, status reasons, sanitized engine output, structured warnings Host retention/monitoring is deployment-owned Preserve tests; document operator integration expectations
R8 Update-design support — GAP_FOUND version-drift workflow; prerelease/manual promotion; checksum verification No applicable default-on automatic installation, notice, opt-out, or temporary postponement evidence P0: decide applicability, then specify and test update UX
R9 Architecture/tests/scanning/release checks — GAP_FOUND race tests, vet/build/test gates, checksums, environment approvals security scans are local-only; 2 high-severity alerts open; SBOM not release evidence P0: gate CI/release on pinned scans and triage alerts; publish reviewed SBOM/provenance if required
R10 Scope/classification/conformity route/market release — HUMAN_REVIEW_REQUIRED MIT public repo and released binaries observed Legal facts and OJ standards/certification applicability not established Legal/product reviewers decide all listed classifications and route

A passing test or scan is evidence of a control execution, not proof of conformity.

<b>Binding provenance</b> 
- findings: [R1]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Article 13(2), Annex I Part I points 1-2", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R2]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Annex I Part I point 3(a)", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R3]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Annex I Part I point 3(b)", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R4]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Annex I Part I points 3(d)-3(g)", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R5, R6, R7]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Annex I Part I points 3(h)-3(l)", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R8]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Annex I Part I point 3(c)", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R9]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Article 13(2), Annex I Parts I-II", authority: "binding"}
- findings: [R10]
  source: {instrument: "Regulation (EU) 2024/2847", provision: "Articles 2, 3, 7-9, 27-32 and Annexes III-IV", authority: "binding"}

Official URL for every entry: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj; verified 2026-10-23. No harmonised standard, certification scheme, active exploitation, reportability threshold, declaration readiness, or release eligibility conclusion was made.

<b>Remediation and disposition register</b>
IDs Accountable owner Disposition Acceptance evidence
R1, R6, R8, R9 Repository maintainer team; pending assignment Technical work pending; R8 blocked on product decision Reviewed files plus green gated CI/release and alert dispositions
R2 Security maintainer; pending assignment Pending human decision: are controlled dependency/secret alerts clear, and how are alerts 1-2 dispositioned? Access-controlled alert export/location and reviewer decision
R3 Security product owner; pending assignment Pending human decision: which defaults/reset semantics apply? Decision record
R5 Operations owner; pending assignment Pending human decision: is runtime restoration applicable and what evidence controls it? Controlled recovery evidence location
R10 Legal counsel and security product owner; pending assignment Pending human decisions on scope, role, FOSS treatment, modification/classification, conformity route, standards/certification, reporting, declaration, and release Signed decision record; no acceptance inferred
<b>Agent prompt</b>

Implement only the approved technical tranche for R1, R6, and R9 in github/gh-aw-threat-detection: add a versioned product risk/threat model with trust boundaries and abuse cases mapped to existing controls/tests; add pinned gosec and govulncheck gates to CI and tagged release; add an explicit, reviewable process for the two current code-scanning alerts; and make release evidence retain scan results without publishing sensitive findings. Do not decide CRA scope, classification, legal conformity, active exploitation, or update applicability. Update tests/docs, run make agent-finish, and provide focused evidence for each acceptance check.

Human Acceptance

A non-bot reviewer should add a thumbs-up reaction only after reviewing the complete matrix, provenance, cross-cutting gaps, remediation backlog, and human-review questions, and confirming every INCOMPLETE and HUMAN_REVIEW_REQUIRED row has an accountable owner and disposition. Current rows have role owners and pending dispositions; acceptance does not resolve them. If either field is removed or left unknown, acceptance is blocked.

What's working

The result channel is notably defensive: model-authored reasons are bounded, transported outside shell arguments, redacted from the publishable result, written atomically with 0600 permissions, and covered by hostile-input tests.

cao: githubnext/gh-cao, correlation: 39900760283-891

Generated by 🛡️ EU CRA / Security · pi · gpt56 · ~72 AIC · ⌖ ~14 AIC · ⊞ 13.6K · ◷

  • expires on Nov 22, 2026, 4:45 AM UTC
Lenguaje dominante
JavaScript
Estrellas
8
Forks
5
Merge medio
2 h 12 min
PR fusionados (30 d)
852

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Primeros pasos

  1. Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
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  4. Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.

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