Interest in an opt-in zero-knowledge mode? (we have a working fork against 2c01922)
Nadie ha tomado este issue todavía.
Evaluación
- Dificultad
- 5/5
- Tiempo estimado
- Más de una semana
- Aptitud para principiantes
- 20/100
- Tipo de issue
- Nueva funcionalidad
- Claridad
- Necesita aclaración
- Estado de actividad
- Activo
- Stack tecnológico
- rust
- Área
- cryptography
Línea de trabajo
Start by comparing the fork branch zk-hiding-pcs with current main, especially prover.rs, which currently asserts !Pcs::ZK. Review the named short-trace and accumulator tests, then clarify with maintainers whether ZK mode is in scope and which quotient-commit approach they prefer; there is no defined implementation or completion criterion until those decisions are made.
Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.
Descripción
We use multi-stark to prove predicates over private certificate attributes,
where the witness has to stay hidden from the verifier. The verifier docs say
the protocol is not zero-knowledge, so we built an opt-in ZK mode on a fork.
It works against an older base. Before porting it to current main we'd like
to know if you would take it, and in what shape.
Fork branch: https://github.com/0ponn/multi-stark/tree/zk-hiding-pcs
(8 commits on 2c01922, 12 files, +1449/-187)
What the fork does
- Hiding PCS config.
GoldilocksBlake3ZkConfiguses Plonky3's
HidingFriPcswith a salted MMCS. Both draw from one shared prover-side CSPRNG handle,
so the salts and the blinding can never come from cloned, identical
streams. The prover and verifier are generic overPcs::ZK. The plain
config's behavior is unchanged, and every end-to-end test also runs under
the ZK config. - Minimum trace height under ZK. The hiding PCS adds only
hrandom rows
to anh-row trace. Withnum_queriesFRI openings plus the out-of-domain
points, a short trace is over-determined. During review we recovered a
4-row trace from a single ZK proof. The branch tests the fix
(zk_short_trace_refused,zk_short_trace_proof_rejected_by_shape) but
not the attack itself, and we can write that up if useful. The fork addsStarkGenericConfig::min_trace_height,
which isnext_pow2(num_queries + 2)under ZK. The prover refuses shorter
traces and the verifier rejects them by shape. - Masked lookup accumulators. The intermediate accumulators are public.
Anyone who can guess a circuit's lookups can replay the transcript for
beta/gamma and confirm the guess. We reproduced this bit for bit
(zk_accumulators_do_not_confirm_witness). Under ZK, each pair of adjacent
circuits shares a secret value, sampled by the prover from the CSPRNG, on a
dedicated
MASK_TAGlookup channel: one circuit pushes it and the next pulls it.
That needs 5 extra stage-1 columns per circuit. The pair cancels in the
lookup sum, so soundness is unchanged, but each published accumulator is
offset by a secret. Claims taggedMASK_TAGare rejected, which closes a
forgery where the unconstrained mask could balance a fake claim
(zk_mask_tag_claim_rejected). It requires a degree-2 challenge field,
because the two secret base elements per link are only uniform over a
quadratic extension. Synchiding MMCS. Plonky3'sMerkleTreeHidingMmcskeeps its RNG in
aRefCell. That makes the config!Sync, which breaks sharing a system
across rayon threads.SyncHidingMmcsuses the same scheme behind a
Mutex.
Known gap: trace heights still leak through proof shape. We handle that in
the application by fixing one trace shape for every proof.
Why this is a question first, not a PR
Current main has moved a long way from our base: sparse systems, logUp
without committed inverses, the quotient committed from coefficients,
sharding, and CUDA. A trial merge conflicts in 11 files. More importantly,
prover.rs now asserts !Pcs::ZK, because commit_ldes and the
accelerated quotient path skip the hiding PCS's randomization. A ZK mode
would need either:
- (a) a ZK-only fallback that commits the quotient through
Pcs::commit
(slower, and CPU only under ZK), or - (b) blinding added to the coefficient and accelerated commit path.
Questions
- Is an opt-in ZK mode something you'd accept, or is it out of scope?
- If yes, which do you prefer for the quotient: (a) or (b)?
- Would you take the parts separately? The minimum trace height and the
Synchiding MMCS are small and independent. The accumulator masking is
the most invasive part and interacts with the new logUp design.
Happy to do the port. We'd rather match your direction than ship a 1.4k-line
surprise.
Separately: Plonky3's batch prover appears to have the same short-trace
issue under HidingFriPcs. We plan to report that there.
- Lenguaje dominante
- Rust
- Estrellas
- 5
- Forks
- 2
- Merge medio
- 3 d 8 h
- PR fusionados (30 d)
- 5
Preparar el entorno
Este proyecto no incluye contenedor de desarrollo, Dockerfile ni guía de contribución, así que la configuración corre por tu cuenta: empieza por su README y consulta nuestra guía para la primera contribución para los pasos generales.
Primeros pasos
- Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
- Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
- Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
- Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.
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