MCP/API setup copies force `http://` base URLs that embed personal Bearer tokens

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@Robert0622 ya está trabajando en esto.

Desde el 9/11/2026.

  • #132 de @Robert0622 — abierto

Evaluación

Dificultad
2/5
Tiempo estimado
1-3 horas
Aptitud para principiantes
75/100
Tipo de issue
Error
Claridad
Bien especificado
Estado de actividad
Activo
Stack tecnológico
go, javascript
Área
api, authentication, security

Línea de trabajo

Empieza en web/app/access.js, en getPublicBaseURL() y las plantillas de MCP y REST que contienen tokens; web/app.js proporciona el nombre de host, mientras que internal/httpapi/studio.go lo inyecta. Lee las indicaciones sobre el proxy inverso HTTPS para el despliegue y sigue cómo llega el esquema de la página a las URL copiadas. El trabajo estará terminado cuando los despliegues seguros generen HTTPS en todas las URL de configuración que contienen tokens y una prueba específica cubra la selección del esquema.

Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.

Descripción

Summary

Access / MCP onboarding builds public base URLs with a hard-coded http:// scheme and interpolates the user’s newly created personal Bearer token into MCP JSON, curl samples, and one-click agent prompts. On deployments that terminate TLS at a reverse proxy while the studio page is reached over HTTPS, following those copied instructions sends long-lived API/MCP tokens in cleartext over HTTP.

Affected code (head c7114fca)

Location What the code does
web/app/access.js getPublicBaseURL() always returns 'http://' + domain — no location.protocol, no HTTPS branch
web/app/access.js Module-level PUBLIC_BASE_URL likewise prefixes http://
web/app/access.js accessMcpClientSpec / accessMcpAgentPrompt embed base + Bearer ${token}
web/app/access.js REST setup: AGENTFLOW_URL=${base} and curl with Bearer token
web/app/access.js MCP tab: same base + token in prompt, manual mcp.json, and curl tools/list
web/app/access.js Token reveal: MCP client spec / agent prompt rebuilt with getPublicBaseURL() + revealed token
web/app.js Domain from <meta name="agentflow-app-domain"> (hostname, no scheme)
internal/httpapi/studio.go stampStudioIndex injects AGENTFLOW_APP_DOMAIN / APP_DOMAIN as meta content (raw domain string)
docs/deployment.md Documents HTTPS reverse proxy in front of the service; AGENTFLOW_SECURE_COOKIES=true when HTTPS terminates at the proxy
.env.example Notes production HTTPS → AGENTFLOW_SECURE_COOKIES=true
Contrast Runner bind copy prefers HTTPS first (deploy/bind-cli.sh); preview UI has HTTPS upgrade helpers in runs.js — Access onboarding does not

Conditions

  1. User is logged in, opens Access (MCP / REST / Token reveal), and creates or reveals a personal token (state.revealedToken).
  2. UI copies snippets that set AGENTFLOW_URL=http://<domain> (or MCP url / curl URL) and Authorization: Bearer <token> using getPublicBaseURL().
  3. Deployment serves the studio over HTTPS at the edge while AGENTFLOW_APP_DOMAIN / APP_DOMAIN is a bare hostname (common TLS-terminated proxy layout per deployment docs). Backend may still speak HTTP to the proxy; that alone is fine — the issue is client instructions that force HTTP for token-bearing calls.
  4. User (or an agent following the pasted prompt) executes the copied HTTP endpoint.

No special attacker role is required beyond the victim following their own Access copy flow (self-inflicted cleartext token transport). Risk materializes when those instructions leave the HTTPS studio context (local agent, curl on another host, MCP client config).

User copy / follow steps (expected misuse path — not captured)

  1. Open Access → MCP (or REST / create Token).
  2. Create token / use “生成并复制” so the prompt or mcp.json contains a real Bearer token.
  3. Observe generated base: always http:// + domain (static reading of getPublicBaseURL; no location.protocol).
  4. Paste into Cursor/Claude/CodeBuddy/Codex or run the curl sample → client contacts http://… with the Bearer token.

Not claimed: MitM observed on a wire, or that every deployment is HTTPS. Claim is: templates force HTTP, which is unsafe whenever the public entry is HTTPS / TLS-terminated.

Impact

  • Cleartext exposure of long-lived personal API/MCP tokens on the path between client and the HTTP origin named in the snippet (MitM, captive portals, corporate proxies).
  • Automated agents that follow the prompt will prefer the insecure endpoint.
  • Mixed-content / confusing breakage is secondary; the security issue is token transport scheme.

Suggested fix

  1. Derive scheme from window.location.protocol, or from a config/meta that may include https:// (e.g. align with LOOPFORGE_PUBLIC_URL / public URL scheme).
  2. Never downgrade an HTTPS studio page to http:// for token-bearing endpoints.
  3. Align Access/MCP copy with runner install guidance that already prefers HTTPS.
  4. Add a unit/UI test that locks scheme selection for token-bearing templates (HTTPS page must not emit http:// bases).

Acceptance criteria

  • Token-bearing setup URLs use HTTPS whenever the studio page or configured public base is HTTPS.
  • No Access/MCP generated snippet forces http:// for a secure deployment.
  • Focused test locks scheme selection for token templates.
  • Issue text does not claim a packet capture unless one is separately recorded.
Lenguaje dominante
Go
Estrellas
141
Forks
28
Merge medio
2 d 15 h
PR fusionados (30 d)
41

Preparar el entorno

Primeros pasos

  1. Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
  2. Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
  3. Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
  4. Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.

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