EscrowService.refund()/release() check the caller's role but never bind the check to the specific escrow's sponsor — any SPONSOR can force-refund any other sponsor's escrow
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@Ranjeet2063 ya está trabajando en esto.
Desde el 20/9/2026.
Evaluación
- Dificultad
- 3/5
- Tiempo estimado
- 1-2 días
- Aptitud para principiantes
- 42/100
- Tipo de issue
- Error
- Claridad
- Bastante claro
- Estado de actividad
- Activo
- Stack tecnológico
- typescript
- Área
- authorization, backend
Línea de trabajo
Start in src/escrow/escrow.service.ts at refund() and release(), which take only escrowId, then in src/escrow/escrow.controller.ts where the route is gated by RolesGuard in src/auth/guards/roles.guard.ts. Thread the caller's id and role from the controller into the service and compare it against escrow.sponsorId for sponsors. Done when a sponsor who did not fund an escrow gets a rejection on refund and release, and the funder's own calls still succeed. The maintainer-of-repository check is not specified, so confirm its scope with the maintainers first.
Escrito por el modelo de indexación a partir del texto del issue.
Descripción
EscrowController.refund() (src/escrow/escrow.controller.ts) is gated by @Roles(UserRole.MAINTAINER, UserRole.SPONSOR) via RolesGuard. Reading src/auth/guards/roles.guard.ts, RolesGuard.canActivate only checks requiredRoles.some((role) => user.roles.includes(role)) — it has zero concept of which resource is being acted on. It never compares the authenticated caller's id to anything on the target Escrow.
EscrowService.refund(escrowId) (src/escrow/escrow.service.ts) takes only escrowId — no caller identity is threaded through at all — and unconditionally refunds to escrow.fundedByAddress, the original funder. So any authenticated user holding the SPONSOR role (not just the sponsor who actually funded this specific escrow, tracked on escrow.sponsorId) can call POST /escrow/:id/refund for any LOCKED escrow in the system and force it back to REFUNDED — cancelling a rival sponsor's active bounty/milestone escrow, even one where a contributor has already done the work and is waiting on release(). Funds don't go to the attacker (they return to the rightful original funder), so this is a griefing/availability attack rather than theft, but it lets one sponsor account unilaterally kill any other sponsor's in-flight payout.
This is distinct from #40 (DTOs trusting client-supplied recipient/funder ids) and #41 (TeamsService.assignToBounty missing an ownership guard on team assignment) — this is specifically the escrow refund/release authorization path lacking an escrow.sponsorId === callingUser.id (or equivalent maintainer-of-repo) check. Note that right now this is latent rather than actively exploitable, because (per the separate "nothing grants SPONSOR/MAINTAINER role" finding) every user is created with only roles: [UserRole.CONTRIBUTOR] and role assignment is currently unreachable through the app's own API. But the moment that's wired up (or a seed script/admin panel grants roles, which is exactly how local dev and e2e fixtures already assign roles), this gap becomes immediately live.
Fix: in EscrowService.refund/release, accept the authenticated caller's id/role from the controller and assert it matches escrow.sponsorId (for SPONSOR) or an appropriate maintainer-of-repository check (for MAINTAINER), not just "has a SPONSOR/MAINTAINER role somewhere."
- Lenguaje dominante
- TypeScript
- Estrellas
- 2
- Forks
- 90
- Merge medio
- 31 min
- PR fusionados (30 d)
- 20
Preparar el entorno
- Incluye un Dockerfile o un archivo de Docker Compose
- Sin plantilla de pull request
- Sin guía de contribución
Primeros pasos
- Lee el issue completo y luego la guía de contribución del proyecto.
- Comenta en el issue que vas a ocuparte — evita que dos personas hagan lo mismo.
- Haz un fork del repositorio y trabaja en una rama.
- Abre un pull request que haga referencia al número del issue.
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