Audit MCP server options across integrations; flag unofficial third-party servers

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Assessment

Difficulty
5/5
Estimated time
Over a week
Newbie friendliness
25/100
Issue type
Documentation
Clarity
Mostly clear
Activity status
Active
Tech stack
github, javascript, python

Research direction

Start with integrations/catalog/*.json and search the repository for other concrete MCP server references; the issue identifies this catalog as the source surfaced by the integrations packages and Customize pane. Cross-check each server’s provenance and health against its repository or package metadata, and check authentication against vendor documentation. Done means a committed audit document inventories every catalog entry, flags risky servers with recommended actions, and links a follow-up issue for each required decision or change.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.

Description

customer-support enhancement priority:medium ready-for-dev

Summary

We need a full audit of every MCP server option surfaced in the OpenHands extensions/integrations catalog (and anywhere else we point users at MCP servers). The goal is to identify which integrations currently rely on unofficial third-party MCP servers rather than first-party/official servers provided by the underlying vendor, and flag them for review.

Why

  • Partner pushback is already happening. While reviewing our Slack MCP integration, Alianza flagged that the Customize pane linked to zencoderai/slack-mcp-server — a third-party server on v0.0.1, stale since July 2025, with a non-standard license. They worked around it with a custom server and said they would be "very loathe to interact with that MCP server in production." Slack's official hosted MCP server now exists and resolves that case (see #900).
  • Unofficial servers carry real risk: unmaintained code, unclear licensing, no vendor accountability, and auth patterns that bypass vendor governance (Slack's official MCP requires workspace-admin approval, audit logs, and Marketplace/internal app identity — third-party servers generally bypass all of that).
  • Trust compounds. Enterprise customers screening our integrations (e.g., before adopting OHE) will scrutinize the provenance of every MCP server we reference. One abandoned third-party server undermines confidence in the whole catalog.
  • We don't currently know the full blast radius. The Slack case was found by a partner, not by us. There may be more integrations pointing at unofficial servers that we haven't reviewed.

What the audit should do (scope)

For each MCP server option in the catalog:

  1. Record the underlying server: repo/URL, maintainer, whether it is official (first-party, vendor-published) or third-party/unofficial
  2. Capture health signals: latest release, last commit/push date, license, stars/activity
  3. Note the auth model and whether it aligns with the vendor's supported governance model (OAuth, admin approval, etc.)
  4. Flag any integration whose MCP server is unofficial, abandoned, unclear-licensed, or otherwise risky for production/enterprise use
  5. Produce a summary table with a recommended action per flag (switch to official server, update pin, remove, keep-with-caveat)

Explicitly out of scope (for this issue)

This issue is only to document the what and why and create the tracking item. The actual investigation of individual integrations and any remediation will happen as follow-up work once the audit plan is agreed.

Related

  • #900 — Update Slack MCP integration to Slack's official hosted MCP server (the concrete Slack case that motivated this audit)

Acceptance criteria

  • Audit scope and method documented (which surfaces are in scope: integrations catalog, Customize pane, docs, skill references)
  • Every MCP server option inventoried with official vs. third-party provenance
  • All unofficial/risky servers flagged in a summary table
  • Follow-up issues created per flagged integration (remediation/decision needed)

This issue was created by an AI agent (OpenHands) on behalf of the user.


OpenHands AI triage

The following comments and acceptance criteria were added by the OpenHands AI agent.

Triage

This is an audit-and-documentation issue, not a code change, and its scope is resolved from repository evidence. The integrations/catalog/*.json files are the hand-authored source of truth (79 entries) consumed by the @openhands/extensions JS and Python packages and rendered as the Customize pane; today only slack.json references a third-party server package (@zencoderai/slack-mcp-server), which #900 already tracks for remediation. Skills and automation manifests name integrations by id and contain no MCP server references, so no additional surfaces need auditing beyond the catalog itself.

The deliverable is a provenance and health audit document (committed under the existing analysis_results.md pattern) covering all catalog entries: official vs third-party provenance for each underlying MCP server, maintained-server health signals, auth-model fit, and a summary table flagging unofficial, abandoned, unclear-licensed, or otherwise production-risky servers with a recommended action. Remediation changes and the Slack fix are explicitly non-goals and belong to follow-up issues.

The customer-support label and the recorded Alianza partner pushback in this issue and #900 constitute real customer evidence, so this is prioritized medium rather than low.

Acceptance Criteria
  • The audit document states the surfaces in scope and the method used, and confirms (with evidence from a repo search) that the hand-authored integrations/catalog/*.json files are the only surface referencing concrete MCP servers, plus any adjacent official docs or MCP registries used for cross-checking.
  • The audit document inventories every entry in integrations/catalog/*.json (79 files at audit time), each with its underlying MCP server (repo/URL or npm/PyPI package), maintainer, and an official (first-party, vendor-published) vs third-party/unofficial classification that a reviewer can verify against the cited repo or vendor docs.
  • The audit document records, for each server, at least: latest release/tag, last commit/push date, license identifier, and maintenance/activity signal, sourced from the server's repo or package metadata (not guessed).
  • The audit document notes, for each server, the auth model the integration exposes (OAuth, API key/token, unauthenticated) and whether it aligns with the vendor's supported governance model (e.g., vendor OAuth, admin approval, marketplace-app identity), citing the vendor documentation where governance requirements exist.
  • The audit document contains a summary table flagging every server that is unofficial, abandoned/stale, unclear-licensed, or otherwise risky for production/enterprise use, with a recommended action per flag (switch to official server, update pin, remove, keep-with-caveat); the Slack entry (@zencoderai/slack-mcp-server) appears flagged with a cross-reference to #900.
  • One follow-up GitHub issue exists per integration flagged for a change (remediation or decision needed), each linked from the audit document and to this issue.
  • The audit document is committed to the repository and, because it is Markdown-only, requires no catalog or generated-index changes (npm run build:integrations and npm run build:skills leave no drift).
Dominant language
Python
Stars
184
Forks
137
Avg merge
1d 19h
Merged PRs (30d)
46

Getting set up

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  • No contributing guide

First steps

  1. Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
  2. Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
  3. Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
  4. Open a pull request that references the issue number.

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