Prevent node spoofing by consensus validation

In the current implementation of Warpnet, there is no robust mechanism to prevent a malicious actor from spoofing a node identity — for example, by imitating a trusted node or injecting a fake node into the network.

CURRENT STATE:

• validation by code hash is to extreme: it makes codebase update impossible
• nodes validate each other by collecting random codebase samples which is not enough

To maintain the integrity and trust of the network, each node must be validated through a decentralized mechanism that ensures its authenticity. This task involves designing and implementing a validation layer based on consensus among existing nodes. The validation must not rely on a central authority and should be resilient to Sybil attacks and other forms of spoofing.

The specific consensus algorithm is not prescribed in this issue; the implementation should remain agnostic to the choice of algorithm, as long as it provides a verifiable, distributed trust mechanism. Goals:

Prevent unauthorized or spoofed nodes from joining the Warpnet network.

Design a consensus-based validation process for authenticating new or existing nodes.

Ensure that node identity cannot be faked, cloned, or misrepresented.

Avoid introducing centralized trust assumptions.

Acceptance Criteria:

A new node must pass a decentralized validation step before being accepted.

Spoofed nodes must be reliably rejected by the network.

The mechanism must be documented and tested across multiple edge cases (e.g., replays, Sybil attempts).

The solution must not depend on a single point of failure or centralized coordination.