OpENer DecodePaddedEPath EPATH path_size OOB read

Start in source/src/cip/cipcommon.c at DecodePaddedEPath, then inspect its callers to understand how incoming_message bounds are available during CIP request decoding. Run poc/opener_epath_oob_read_repro.c with the documented ASan setup and review poc/OPENER-01-asan.txt. Done means malformed paths no longer read beyond the received buffer and the regression reproducer no longer reports an OOB read.

Target: OpENer (EIPStackGroup EtherNet/IP + CIP stack). source/src/cip/cipcommon.c — DecodePaddedEPath.
Affected version: commit 36943e6 (HEAD at time of test); present at HEAD.

Summary

OpENer decodes a CIP EPATH (electronic path) by reading a path_size count byte from the request and then
walking that many path words — without a remaining-buffer-length argument or bound. A request whose EPATH
path_size is larger than the actual data walks off the end of the incoming_message receive buffer.

Technical details

/* source/src/cip/cipcommon.c : DecodePaddedEPath */
number_of_decoded_elements = *message;   /* :1397 path_size, one wire byte, 0..255 words — attacker-controlled */
++message;
while (number_of_decoded_elements < path_size) {     /* :1404 no check vs the received buffer end */
    ...
    case ...:                                        /* e.g. class/instance/attribute segments */
        /* reads *(message+1), message += 2  — walks 2+ bytes per iteration off the buffer */
}

DecodePaddedEPath receives only the message pointer, not the number of bytes remaining in incoming_message
(a fixed receive buffer, ~512 bytes on the stack/session). With path_size = 0xFF and segment bytes that keep
the loop consuming, the walk reads well past the buffer.

Proof of Concept

• Faithful ASan model (poc/opener_epath_oob_read_repro.c): a 300-byte redzoned buffer models the tail of
  incoming_message; buf[0] = 255 (path_size = max), segment type bytes drive the 2-bytes/iteration walk with
  no end check. ASan (poc/OPENER-01-asan.txt): heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 past the 300-byte region.

Root cause

DecodePaddedEPath trusts the in-band path_size count and lacks a remaining-length parameter, so the segment
walk has no upper bound tied to the actual received size.

Impact / Exploitation

An unauthenticated remote attacker (ENIP is unauthenticated) makes an OpENer device read past its receive buffer
while decoding a CIP path — information disclosure of adjacent memory reflected into subsequent processing/
responses, or a crash (DoS) of the industrial device. OpENer is embedded in many EtherNet/IP field devices.

Suggested Remediation

Give DecodePaddedEPath the number of bytes remaining in incoming_message and check every segment read
against it (fail if path_size/segment reads would exceed the remaining length). This mirrors the bounded
decoding used elsewhere in the CIP request path.